Fairness and Antitrust Reconsidered: An Evolutionary Perspective by Horton, Thomas J.
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 44 | Issue 4 Article 2
1-1-2013
Fairness and Antitrust Reconsidered: An
Evolutionary Perspective
Thomas J. Horton
University of South Dakota School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas J. Horton, Fairness and Antitrust Reconsidered: An Evolutionary Perspective, 44 McGeorge L. Rev. 823 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/2




Fairness and Antitrust Reconsidered: An Evolutionary 
Perspective 
Thomas J. Horton 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 823 
II. THE ANTITRUST AND FAIRNESS DEBATE .................................................... 827 
 A.  The Case Against Fairness .................................................................... 829 
 B.  The Case for Fairness as a Core Antitrust Principle ............................ 835 
 C.  Developing a Workable Fairness Standard .......................................... 851 
III. POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF FAIRNESS NORMS IN ANTITRUST CASES ....... 852 
 A.  Applying Evolutionary Standards to Consumer Welfare False 
Negatives ............................................................................................... 853 
  1.  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith ............................................. 855 
  2.  Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. .......... 857 
  3.  Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber .............. 859 
 B.  Applying Evolutionary Standards to Consumer Welfare False 
Positives ................................................................................................ 860 
  1.  FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn. (“SCTLA”) ............... 860 
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 863 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Fairness” seems to be a dirty word today in American antitrust circles.1 For 
many American jurists and scholars, the notion that antitrust and competition law 
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1. See, e.g., PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 651h (3d ed. 2008) (“The concern of [Sherman Act] § 2 is 
with monopoly, not unfairness or deception.”); ELEANOR M. FOX & LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST 145–46 (1989) (discussing efforts of “some jurists and scholars. . .to excise fairness 
from the antitrust lexicon.”). 
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should incorporate moral norms of fairness is anathema.2 They believe that 
“fairness and competition are like oil and water; they do not mix.”3 In the words 
of Seventh Circuit jurist and former academic Frank Easterbrook: “Who says that 
competition is supposed to be fair. . . ?”4 
Jurists’ and scholars’ efforts to “excise fairness from the antitrust lexicon” 
have been steady and unremitting since the 1960s.5 For example, in 1980, iconic 
and revered antitrust scholars like Professors Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner 
described fairness “as a vagrant claim applied to any value that one happens to 
favor.”6 Some influential scholars have even posited that when “notions of 
fairness” are considered in legal analyses, “individuals tend to be made worse 
off.”7 
Such attacks are somewhat surprising given the importance of fairness norms 
to the framers of the Sherman Act8—not to mention America’s founding fathers 
and religious leaders.9 In the Sherman Act’s legislative history, “[r]epeated 
 
2. See Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 
105 (2007) (“It has been a long time since anyone has thought about antitrust in explicitly moral terms. . . .”); 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets, 28 J. CORP. L. 607, 609 (2003) (“[A]ntitrust has 
no moral content.”); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 10, 54 
(2005) (stating that antitrust is not concerned with the moral implications of conduct—only the economic 
implications). 
3. FOX & SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 146. 
4. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 577 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
5. FOX & SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 146; see also Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Lessons for Competition Law 
from the Economic Crisis: The Prospect for Antitrust Responses to the “Too-Big-To-Fail” Phenomenon, 16 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 278–81 (2011) (discussing the continued Post-Chicago “adherence to the limited 
objective of economic efficiency”); Michael Ruse, Evolutionary Ethics Past and Present, in EVOLUTION AND 
ETHICS: HUMAN MORALITY IN BIOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE 27 (P. Clayton & J. Sachs eds., 
2004) ( “[Forty years ago, evolutionary ethics was the philosophical equivalent of a bad smell.”). 
6. 4 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 21 (1980). 
7. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 966 (2001).; see 
also infra Section II.A.; FOX & SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 146 (noting that jurists and scholars attacking 
fairness “define competition solely as a means to produce efficiency—primarily allocative efficiency—and 
contend that any competition policy that does not single-mindedly aim at efficiency will therefore produce 
inefficiency and will therefore make all of us (counted by our aggregate wealth) worse off.”). 
8. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7. Section 1 prohibits contracts, 
combinations in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracies in trade or commerce. Section 2 prohibits 
monopolization and attempts or conspiracies to monopolize. 
9. See 1 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 20 
(Earl W. Kintner ed. 1978); see also, e.g., Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement, THE 
BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT 113, 149 (Earl Frank Cheit ed., 1964) (arguing that America’s antitrust laws and 
enforcement are based on “political and moral judgment” and not on “outcome of economic measurement”); 
Larry Arnhart, The Darwinian Moral Sense and Biblical Religion, in BIOLOGICAL & RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE 
204, 205–20; FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 35 
(1995) (“The most important habits that make up cultures have little to do with how one eats one’s food or 
combs one’s hair but with the ethical codes by which societies regulate behavior . . . . Despite their variety, all 
cultures seek to constrain the raw selfishness of human nature in some fashion through the establishment of 
unwritten moral rules.”). As stated in a website on fairness: 
One of the earliest laws that we are taught is the need for fairness. It is universal to every culture, 
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reference was also made throughout the proceedings to the policy favoring 
‘freedom and fairness’ in commercial intercourse. . . .”10 In the Senate debates, 
Alabama Senator James L. Pugh, for example, frequently asserted that trusts go 
against public policy, and stated that trusts and combinations “hinder, interrupt, 
and impair the freedom and fairness of commerce. . . .”11 
Economics rules antitrust today. Jurists and scholars favoring economic 
“consumer welfare”12 considerations and disfavoring fairness considerations in 
antitrust analyses are ascendant.13 Allocative efficiency is positively equated with 
 
creed and era. All of our fairy stories, our most popular works of fiction and our blockbuster movies 
are based on the innate fairness of nature. Our moral, political and spiritual leaders all stress the need 
for fairness. 
Out of this core belief our religious, social systems and conventions have been based. The Law of 
Fairness, COACHING TO HAPPINESS, http://coachingtohappiness.com/stress-management/law-fairness (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
10. 1 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 20 (Earl 
W. Kintner ed. 1978). 
11. 21 CONG. REC. 2256 (Mar. 24, 1890), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10 at 154–57; 
see also RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 14 (1996) 
(“Senator Sherman began the debate about his bill to secure ‘full and fair competition’ with the familiar themes 
of industrial liberty and consumerism. . . .”); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at ¶ 103, (“A substantial 
history from sources other than the legislative debates suggests that the proponents of the Sherman Act were 
significantly more concerned about injury to competitors than injury to consumers.”). 
12. See Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic 
Approach 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 2, 4 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2039337 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
It is important to note that “[t]he goal of antitrust, as understood by economic analysis, involves a choice of 
either total welfare or consumer welfare. Total welfare reflects the overall economic surplus from both 
producers and consumers. In contrast, consumer welfare refers to the surplus that goes only to consumers and 
does not include producer surplus.” Id. 
A serious problem, however, is that scholars, commentators, and judges, including the Supreme Court, 
frequently have confused the two concepts. Id. Blair and Sokol believe that this problem arose because 
Professor Bork “[used] the term consumer welfare when he meant total welfare.” Id.; see also John B. 
Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing 
Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 200 n.30 (2008) (observing that “[m]any commentators have pointed 
out that Bork’s terminology was confusing . . . .The more accurate synonym for economic efficiency is total 
welfare. . . .”). Kirkwood and Lande add: “Bork used ‘consumer welfare’ as an Orwellian term of art that has 
little or nothing to do with the welfare of true consumers . . . .If he had been honest, Bork would have used 
‘total welfare’ as the synonym for economic efficiency, the term employed by the economics profession for this 
purpose.” Id. at 199–200. 
A full analysis of the differences between economic consumer welfare and total welfare standards is 
beyond the scope of this Article. However, the differences ultimately are not dispositive of or even critical to 
the analysis in this paper. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and Consumer Welfare in Antitrust 9 
(2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1873463 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“The volume 
and complexity of the academic debate on the general welfare vs. consumer welfare question creates an 
impression of policy significance that is completely belied by the case law, and largely by government 
enforcement policy. Few if any decisions have turned on the difference. In fact, antitrust policy generally 
applies both tests . . . .”). 
13. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 563–66 (2012) 
(discussing ascendance of Chicago School’s neoclassical economic theories in American antitrust jurisprudence 
since the late 1970s); Markham, supra note 5, at 278 (“The current state of antitrust law is often referred to as 
embracing ‘Post-Chicago School’ economic theory. Post-Chicago School antitrust is the stepchild of Chicago 
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consumer welfare.  Arguably, consumers are better positioned in markets that 
produce economically efficient transactions.14 Contemporary U.S. antitrust 
analysis focuses almost solely on economic goals.15 
American antitrust’s deference to economics leaves little room for 
supposedly non-economic goals such as fairness.16 For example, recent Supreme 
Court decisions have “acknowledged antitrust’s economic goals, but not its 
political, social, and moral goals.”17 The Court even has gone so far as to say that 
“Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’”18 
This Article reconsiders the antitrust fairness-versus-welfare debate from an 
evolutionary perspective. Section II.A. discusses the various arguments against 
applying fairness norms in antitrust cases. Section II.B. then sets forth the 
arguments for reincorporating fairness norms into antitrust analyses. Building 
upon the evolutionary analyses in previous papers,19 and the growing “enthusiasm 
 
School antitrust. . . .”); id. at 281 (“‘Post-Chicago’ antitrust theory departs from the Chicago School views 
mostly around the margins.”); Lynn A. Stout, Taking Conscience Seriously, MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL 
ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 157, 158 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008). Stout argues that “modern professors 
teach their students in economics, law, and business courses . . . to assume that people are ‘rational maximizers’ 
who behave like members of the mythical species Homo economicus. Economic Man does not worry about 
morality, ethics, or other people. Instead, Economic Man is cold and calculating, worries only about himself, 
and pursues whatever course brings him the greatest material advantage.” 
14. See Markham, supra note 5, at 280. Allocative efficiency refers to “the avoidance of economically 
inefficient transactions . . . .” Id. at 278. 
15. See ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHON B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN 
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 39 (2d ed. 2008). 
16. Id. As noted by Professors Gavil, Kovacic, and Baker: 
Although . . . courts sometimes have articulated non-economic goals for U.S. antitrust law, their 
reliance on such goals as a source of useful guidance for deciding particular cases has consistently 
waned since the early 1970s. Non-economic goals frequently conflict with economic aims, provide 
too little guidance for antitrust decision makers, and arguably are ill-suited to decision-making 
processes that rely on adjudication and the adversary system. 
Id. at 39–40; see also Markham, supra note 5, at 264–65 (“[T]he antitrust laws in the United States began a 
steady process of judicial erosion to eliminate multiple and possibly conflicting policy objectives, distilling in 
their place the exclusive purpose of promoting consumer welfare through allocative and dynamic efficiency.”); 
Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 81 (2007) 
(observing that it is “generally assumed today” that “allocative efficiency is the goal.”). 
17. Stucke, supra note 13, at 566. Similarly, competition officials during the Bush administration urged 
that the “promotion of consumer welfare and the organization of the free market economy are the only goals of 
[the] antitrust laws. . .with other economic or social objectives better pursued by other instruments.” INT’L 
COMPETITION NETWORK, REPORT ON THE OBJECTIVES OF UNILATERAL CONDUCT LAWS, ASSESSMENT OF 
DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER, AND STATE-CREATED MONOPOLIES 31 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 
ICN REPORT], available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
18. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 
343 (1979)); see also Brooke Grp., Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221 (1993) 
(noting “antitrust laws’ traditional concern for consumer welfare and price competition”). 
19. Thomas J. Horton, Unraveling the Chicago/Harvard Antitrust Double Helix: Applying Evolutionary 
Theory to Guard Competitors and Revive Antitrust Jury Trials, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 615 (2012) [hereinafter 
Horton, Antitrust Double Helix]; Thomas J. Horton, The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the 
Eclipse of the Chicago School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structural and Behavioral 
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for approaches that try to link our morality to our evolutionary biology,”20 this 
Article recommends that courts and antitrust regulators apply an evolutionary 
analysis instead of the static economic consumer and total welfare norms in 
vogue today. The new focus would be on fairness norms, intent, and competitive 
harm. Section II.C. discusses developing a workable antitrust fairness standard 
built around considerations of fairness, anticompetitive intent, and competitive 
harm. 
Section III addresses four contemporary Supreme Court antitrust decisions 
that likely would have been decided differently if they applied an evolutionary 
analysis and fairness norms. Section III.A. addresses a series of “false negatives” 
in three predatory pricing cases that were decided under an economic consumer 
welfare approach. Next, it proposes that each case should have been decided by a 
citizen jury that focused on fairness, intent, and competitive harm. Had that 
happened, each likely would have been decided in the plaintiffs’ favor. Section 
III.B. then discusses how the economic consumer welfare approach ironically has 
led to “false positives” and an overly aggressive application of the Sherman Act 
in cases such as FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn.21 
This Article concludes that from an evolutionary perspective, basic notions 
of fairness are critical to the efficient functioning of competitive markets.22 It is 
therefore time to begin reincorporating evolutionary norms of fairness into 
antitrust analyses. By paying more attention to fairness, intent, and competitive 
harm, American antitrust jurisprudence and practice can again become a positive 
force in building and sustaining “free and fair” competitive 21st century 
markets.23 
II. THE ANTITRUST AND FAIRNESS DEBATE 
Should considerations of fairness play any role in substantive antitrust 
analyses? Should judges or antitrust juries consider fairness norms in deciding 
antitrust cases? As discussed above, many American judges, commentators, and 
academics active in the antitrust arena believe that the simple answers to such 
 
Antitrust Analyses, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 469 (2011) [hereinafter Horton, Coming Extinction]; Thomas J. Horton, 
Competition or Monopoly? The Implications of Complexity Science, Chaos Theory, and Evolutionary Biology 
for Antitrust and Competition Policy, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 195 (2006) [hereinafter Horton, Competition or 
Monopoly?]. 
20. Ruse, supra note 5, at 27. 
21. 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990). 
22. See MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY xi (P. Zak ed. 2008). 
(“[M]odern market exchange is inconceivable without moral values.”). 
23. See Stucke, supra note 13, at 554–55 (discussing how the significance of antitrust has diminished 
substantially in the United States while its international importance is steadily growing); see also Marc D. 
Whitener, Editor’s Note: The End of Antitrust?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2007, at 5 (“The rhetoric and arguably, the 
enforcement records of the agencies—outside the cartel arena—are less activist now than at any time in recent 
years.”). 
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questions are no.24 Following their logic, many jurists and scholars limit their 
antitrust focus primarily to neoclassical economic considerations of consumer 
welfare and allocative efficiency. Section II.A. sets forth the arguments and 
considerations against applying fairness norms in antitrust analyses. 
In the last few years, a growing number of commentators and academics, 
including this author, have disagreed with the popular neo-classical approaches 
to antitrust analyses.25 Approaching antitrust from an interdisciplinary 
perspective, these critics seek a consilience26 between antitrust and such 
burgeoning fields as evolutionary biology and behavioral economics. They 
believe that consideration of fairness norms is crucial if antitrust is to remain 
relevant and vigorous in the coming decades. Their positions are set forth in 
Section II.B. below.27 
Based on these discussions, Section II.C. concludes that it makes 
evolutionary and competitive sense to reincorporate norms of fairness into 
modern antitrust analyses. Such considerations can be combined with a sharper 
focus on intent and competitive harm to create an effective antitrust regulatory 
scheme that is consistent with our evolutionary and behavioral heritages. Citizen 
jurors are evolutionarily hard-wired to understand and assess competitive fairness 
and intent.28 Conversely, the ever-changing and biased neoclassical norms of 
consumer welfare and allocative efficiency make sense only in an anti-
democratic context.  Under the prevailing system, antitrust cases are kept away 
 
24. See supra notes 13–18. 
25. See, e.g., KENNETH M. DAVIDSON, REALITY IGNORED: HOW MILTON FRIEDMAN AND CHICAGO 
ECONOMICS UNDERMINED AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND ENDANGERED THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2011); HOW 
THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U. S. 
ANTITRUST (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008); WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX: 
INDUSTRY, LABOR AND GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 9 (2d ed. 2004); Kirkwood & Lande,supra 
note 12, at 626; Eleanor M. Fox, The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust, 75 CAL. L. REV. 917, 917 (1987). 
26. EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 8–14 (1998) (describing 
consilience—the “unity of knowledge” derived from a synthesis of difference sciences—as an interdisciplinary 
tool that can increase diversity and depth of knowledge through an underlying cohesion). 
27. It is important to point out that fairness, as it is discussed in this Article, does not mean an equality 
of competitive outcomes. Thus, this Article does not attempt to survey or discuss the rich economics literature 
assessing the classic “efficiency versus equity” argument, as it relates to how resources are distributed 
throughout society. See, e.g., Jules Le Grand, Equity Versus Efficiency: The Elusive Trade-Off, 100 ETHICS 554, 
554 (1990); Robin Broadway, Integrating Equity and Efficiency in Applied Welfare Economics, 90 Q. J. ECON. 
541, 541 (1976). Instead, it is understood that the goal of competition is “to facilitate production of the best 
products and services and an optimal product/service mix for consumers.” FOX & SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 
145. For Professors Fox and Sullivan, “fairness in the antitrust context has three different components, none of 
which is incompatible with consumer interests: (1) Is the defendant using power and position rather than merit 
to block the path of a less well-situated competitor? (2) Is the defendant using power to exploit a buyer or 
seller? (3) Does the defendant have such control over access to the process of competition itself that it can and 
does set arbitrary rules about who can participate and who is excluded?” Id. 
28. See, e.g., Horton, Antitrust Double Helix, supra note 19, at 661, 654; Horton, Coming Extinction, 
supra note 19, at 505, 510. 
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from juries and dominant firms maintain the ability to engage in predatory 
behavior.29 
A. The Case Against Fairness 
A primary economic attack against considerations of fairness in antitrust 
analyses is that such notions allegedly “perversely reduce welfare, indeed 
sometimes everyone’s well-being . . . .”30 In their seminal 2001 Harvard Law 
Review article Fairness Versus Welfare, Harvard Law Professors Louis Kaplow 
and Steven Shavell posit that “no independent weight should be accorded to 
conceptions of fairness” because “when the choice of legal rules is based even in 
part on notions of fairness, individuals tend to be made worse off.”31 Instead of 
fairness, a “welfare-based normative approach should be exclusively employed in 
evaluating legal rules.”32 Kaplow and Shavell argue that: 
[A]dvancing notions of fairness reduces individuals’ well-being. . . . By 
definition, welfare economic analysis is concerned with individuals’ 
well-being, whereas fairness-based analysis (to the extent that it differs 
from welfare economic analysis) is concerned with adherence to certain 
stipulated principles that do not depend on individuals’ well-being. Thus, 
promoting notions of fairness may well involve a reduction in 
individuals’ well-being.33 
Kaplow and Shavell attempt to demonstrate “a number of paradigmatic 
situations in which . . . promoting notions of fairness would make everyone 
worse off.”34 
Kaplow’s and Shavell’s criticisms of fairness as a viable and meaningful 
legal concept meshed perfectly with the ascendant Chicago School of antitrust 
thinking that antitrust analysis could be unified around a single economic goal: 
the improvement of allocative efficiency “without impairing productive 
efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer 
welfare.”35 As noted by antitrust scholar and Seventh Circuit Judge Richard A. 
Posner, “The allocative-efficiency or consumer-welfare concept of competition 
dominates current thinking, judicial and academic, in the antitrust field.”36 The 
 
29. 2007 ICN REPORT, supra note 17, at 31. 
30. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, 
Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 331 (2003). 
31. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 966 (2001). 
32. Id. at 967. 
33. Id. at 971. 
34. Id. 
35. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 91 (1978); see also 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, at viii–ix (2d ed. 2001). 
36. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States, 704 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1983); see also POSNER, 
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Chicagoans’ economic goal was based upon “their largely static conception of 
competition, strong belief in the rationality of market participants, skepticism 
over the likelihood and extent of market failures, and doubts about the 
government’s institutional capacities.”37 The Chicagoans believed that absent 
government interference and the injection of political, moral, and social goals 
into antitrust analyses, markets would naturally lead to increased efficiency and 
consumer welfare.38 Political, moral, and social goals and values, such as fairness, 
simply had no role to play in rigorous antitrust economic analyses.39 
A second attack against considerations of fairness is that they could 
potentially sweep too much conduct that is not harmful to the overall competitive 
process within the ambit of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.40 A major concern is 
that generating “false positives” in antitrust analyses could chill aggressive 
competition and harm consumer welfare.41 For example, Professors Areeda and 
Hovenkamp argue that “[e]ven if one defines ‘exclusionary’ conduct with an eye 
only toward injunction, most conduct that is ‘unfair’ under state tort law or FTC 
Act § 5 fails to be ‘exclusionary’ under Sherman Act § 2. . . .The concern of § 2 
is with monopoly, not unfairness or deception.”42 Importantly, however, they 
went on to concede that “in the presence of substantial market power, some kinds 
of tortious behavior could anticompetitively create or sustain a monopoly, and it 
would then warrant condemnation under § 2.”43 
 
supra note 35, at ix. 
37. Stucke, supra note 13, at 563. 
38. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE 71-73 (4th ed. 2011) (summarizing the Chicago School’s theories); Walter Adams & James W. 
Brock, Antitrust, Ideology, and the Arabesques of Economic Theory, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 282–93 (1995); 
Horton, Coming Extinction, supra note 18, at 506–07; Stucke, supra note 13, at 563-64; Edwin J. Hughes, The 
Left Side of Antitrust: What Fairness Means and Why It Matters,77 MARQ. L. REV. 265, 269–273 (1994). 
39. See Markham, Jr., supra note 5, at 280; Stucke, supra note 13, at 563–64. 
40. See, e.g., Northwest Power Products, Inc. v. Omark Indus., 576 F.2d 83, 88 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979) (“[T]he purposes of antitrust law and unfair competition law generally conflict. 
The thrust of antitrust law is to prevent restraints on competition. Unfair competition is still competition and the 
purpose of the law of unfair competition is to impose restraints on that competition.”); 3 P. AREEDA & D. 
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 737b (1978) (The authors “doubt that . . .torts. . .would very often seriously impair 
the competitive activities of rivals in any significant or permanent way. . . . [Plaintiffs must show] significant 
and more-than-temporary harmful effects on competition (and not merely upon a competitor or customer.”). 
41. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004). 
Professor Hovenkamp has characterized Chicagoans’ concerns about “false positives” as “The Fake Problem of 
False Positives in Competitor Lawsuits.” Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 
1, 33 (1989). 
42. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at ¶ 651h. 
43. Id. at 126. Areeda and Hovenkamp further point out that “it is not enough under § 2 to find that a 
firm has engaged in ‘unfair’ conduct; the antitrust tribunal must also decide that the conduct has had, or is likely 
to have, the effect of significantly impairing the ability of rivals to compete.” Id. at 125–26. 
_01_HORTON_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2014 9:39 AM 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44 
831 
Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook went even further in condemning 
“fairness” as a way to dilute pro-competitive competition. He argued: 
My brethren want rivalry to be “fair”. . . . Who says that competition is 
supposed to be fair, that we judge the behavior of the marketplace by the 
ethics of the courtroom . . . . When economic pressure must give way to 
fair conduct, as the court today holds it must, rivals will trim their sails. 
Fair competition is tempered competition.44 
Judge Easterbrook believes that competition is akin to “warfare,”45 and finds 
“[m]uch competition unfair, or at least ungentlemanly; it is designed to take sales 
away from one’s rivals.”46 
The Supreme Court has followed the reasoning of Professors Areeda and 
Hovenkamp and Judge Easterbrook. For example, in 1993, in Brook Group Ltd. 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,47 the Court went out of its way to dismiss 
fairness as a relevant concept in antitrust analyses.48 Lauding the so-called 
consumer welfare benefits of below-cost pricing by a dominant firm, the Court 
stated that the antitrust laws “do not create a federal law of unfair 
competition. . . .”49 The Supreme Court added that absent strong proof of 
recoupment, “predatory pricing produces lower aggregate prices in the market, 
and consumer welfare is enhanced.”50 That predatory pricing caused a competitor 
targeted by a dominant firm to suffer “painful losses” was of “no moment to the 
antitrust laws” because “[i]t is axiomatic that the antitrust laws were passed for 
‘the protection of competition, not competitors.’ ”51 
The Supreme Court cited Brook Group approvingly and followed a similar 
tack in 1998 in Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc.52 Discon had been driven out of the 
market for the removal of obsolete telephone equipment through a fraudulent 
deal between NYNEX and AT&T Technologies.53 Nevertheless, the Court 
refused to apply the per se rule, and held that “the plaintiff here must allege and 
 
44. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 577 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in part). 
45. Schachar v. Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397, 399 (7th Cir. 1989). 
46. Sanderson v. Culligan Int’l Co., 415 F.2d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2005); see also R. Hewitt Pate, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., DOJ, Remarks at the International Conference on Competition: Competition and Politics 
2 (June 6, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/210522.pdf (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (arguing that in antitrust analyses, “the inclusion of other, non-competition values is 
very dangerous, and we need to be very careful with it.”). 
47. 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
48. Id. at 243. 
49. Id. at 225. 
50. Id. at 224. 
51. Id. (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)). For a detailed discussion of 
why “the protection of competition, not competitors” language is not “axiomatic” at all, see Horton, Antitrust 
Double Helix, supra note 19, at 623–32. 
52. 525 U.S. 128,136–37 (1998). 
53. Id. at 131. 
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prove harm, not just to a single competitor, but to the competitive process, i.e., to 
competition itself.”54 The Court reasoned that “other laws, for example, ‘unfair 
competition’ laws, business tort laws, or regulatory laws, provide remedies for 
various ‘competitive practices thought to be offensive to proper standards of 
antitrust morality.’”55 The Court then cited Brooke Group to justify its lenient 
treatment of the fraudulent and successful exclusionary conduct, and quoted the 
portion of the Brook Group opinion where the court noted that “[e]ven an act of 
pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, without more, 
state a claim under the federal antitrust laws.”56 
A third attack against considerations of fairness is that fairness is a subjective 
concept that lacks any meaningful economic guidance. For example, Professors 
Areeda and Turner argued that “[a]s a goal of antitrust policy, ‘fairness’ is a 
vagrant claim applied to any value that one happens to favor.”57 More than fifty 
years ago, in 1959, Professors Kaysen and Turner similarly “could not find any 
criterion of ‘fairness’ in conduct that would enable them to distinguish 
competitive from noncompetitive situations. They condemned as ‘superficial’ 
any attempt to use antitrust laws to [forbid] the use of unfair tactics as a means of 
acquiring monopoly power.”58 
Similarly, Professors Kaplow and Shavell contended that “claims that one or 
another outcome is unfair are often unhelpful because they convey little 
information beyond the fact of the author’s condemnation.”59 Economist George 
Stigler went even further, characterizing fairness as “a suitcase full of bottled 
ethics from which one freely chooses to blend his own type of justice.”60 
Even for such an aggressive progressive antitrust thinker as the late Alfred E. 
Kahn, who believed in “fair competition [as] an ‘end in itself,’”61 the concept of 
fairness in antitrust was somewhat problematic because “business size and 
integration almost inevitably confer certain ‘unfair’ competitive advantages and 
give rise to corresponding possibilities of the extension of monopoly.”62 Kahn 
explained: “If all competitors were equally able to integrate, no unfairness or 
danger of an extension of monopoly would enter. But inequity may be introduced 
 
54. Id. at 135. 
55. Id. at 137 (quoting 3 P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 651 (1996)). 
56. Nynex, 525 U.S. at 137 (quoting Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 225). 
57. 4 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 21 (1980). 
58. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 67. 80 (2012) 
(discussing and citing CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 15–18 (1959)). 
59. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 31, at 335. 
60. George J. Stigler, The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the Scholars, 1 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 4 (1972). 
61. Alfred E. Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Performance, MONOPOLY POWER AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE: THE PROBLEM OF INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 169, 177 (Edwin Mansfield ed., 1968). 
62. Id. at 180. 
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by mere inequality in the ability of these companies to attract capital—an 
inequality which tends to be cumulative.”63 
Similarly, Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp discussed at length the 
Sherman Act legislative history’s substantial concern with “injuries to 
competitors rather than injuries to consumers.”64 They conceded that “[p]erhaps 
we might separate out for condemnation those policies of firms that burden rivals 
‘unfairly.’ ”65 But they added, “ . . . nothing in the [Sherman] Act or its history 
tells us how big such a firm must be or what the criteria of unfairness are.”66 
Professors Kaplow and Shavell likewise were concerned by what they viewed as 
a lack of precision in defining fairness. They argued that “[t]he notion of fairness 
must be stated with some precision and in a manner that is complete (unlike 
virtually all the leading notions of fairness that we consider).”67 
A related concern is that the lack of any objective standard for considerations 
of fairness could lead to the application of widely divergent standards and result 
in markedly inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes. In defining objective 
standards of fairness, courts theoretically could be forced to consult divergent 
state tort laws.  Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp, for example, noted that state 
business tort laws “var[y], sometimes widely, from state to state.”68 They posited 
that “it makes no sense to treat two monopolists differently under § 2 because of 
fortuitous differences in state tort law. In short, antitrust courts would at the least 
have to formulate a ‘federal’ law of business torts.”69 Professors Areeda and 
Hovenkamp concluded that from a purely practical perspective, “it seems far 
more sensible to deal with the question of what is ‘exclusionary’ in light of the 
purposes of § 2.”70 
Many economists and antitrust practitioners go even further. They believe 
that considerations of fairness and unfairness should play no role in antitrust 
analyses because “business competition may simply be amoral.”71 Indeed, some 
scholars have gone so far as to suggest that “antitrust has no ethical component” 
and “no moral content.”72 Judge Bork, for example, argues that “[c]onsumer 
 
63. Id. at 181. 
64. 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 103b (3d ed. 2006). 
65. Id. at ¶ 103d. 
66. Id. 
67. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, supra note 31, at 361. 
68. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 651h at 127, n. 89. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. James H. Michelman, Some Ethical Consequences of Economic Competition, in BUSINESS ETHICS: 
A PHILOSOPHICAL READER 30, 32 (Thomas I. White ed., 1993); see also MILTON H. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM 
AND FREEDOM 133 (40th anniversary ed. 2002) (“Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very 
foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to 
make as much money for their stockholders as possible.”); Horton, Coming Extinction, supra note 19, at 505. 
72. Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 951, 989 (2008); Id. at n. 
140 (quoting Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets, 28 J. CORP. L. 607, 609 (2003) 
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welfare, as that term is used in antitrust, has no sumptuary or ethical component 
. . . .”73 Economist Oliver Williamson similarly opined that trust is an empty 
category when one subtracts out apparently trustworthy behavior that can be 
explained on the basis of rational self-interest.74 As summarized cogently by 
Francis Fukuyama: 
Many people would not accept the fact that something done by a 
corporation in its own self-interest can have any moral content. . .  .This 
is all the more true of economists, who want to keep their science free of 
any kind of dependence on moral motivation.75 
Taking a seemingly practical perspective, numerous Chicago School scholars 
and disciples have further argued that fairness should play no role in antitrust 
analyses because most monopolies, dominant firms, and so-called predatory 
conduct actually are highly pro-competitive, and ultimately increase overall 
consumer welfare.76 These scholars and their adherents long have sought to 
“make ‘survival of the fittest’ in economic markets a [close] analogy to the 
struggle for survival in the biological world.”77 Ultimately, they have leveraged 
the views of Joseph Schumpeter and Milton Friedman that monopolies and 
unfairness are economically natural and acceptable.78 As previously noted, 
Chicagoans like Judge Frank Easterbrook believe that attempts to address 
competitive unfairness through the antitrust laws will result in an unacceptably 
high rate of antitrust “false positives.”79 
Finally, “[h]owever many articles there have been on fairness, and however 
important economists may consider fairness, it has been continually pushed into a 
back channel in economic thinking.”80 Economists George Akerlof and Robert 
Shiller argue that economists tend to diminish the importance of fairness in 
economic analyses because “[e]conomics textbooks are supposed to be about 
 
(“[A]ntitrust has no moral content. . . .”)); see also Horton, Coming Extinction, supra note 19, at 506. 
73. BORK, supra note 35, at 90. 
74. Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L. & ECON. 453, 
454 (1993). 
75. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF 
SOCIAL ORDER 259 (1999). 
76. See, e.g., Markham, supra note 5, at 264 (“Whatever animated their enactment, antitrust laws no 
longer concern themselves with preventing bigness, and indeed tend instead to encourage large-scale enterprise 
for efficiency’s sake.”). 
77. Horton, Coming Extinction, supra note 19 at 479 (citing Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models 
in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV. 645, 683 (1985)). 
78. See, e.g., Horton, Coming Extinction, supra note 19, at 479–82. 
79. Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for Exclusionary Conduct?, 
2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 345, 357–58 (arguing that predation and exclusion should be “governed by a wait-
and-see attitude” because the economic costs of false positives are so high). 
80. GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES 
THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 20 (2009). 
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economics, not psychology, anthropology, sociology, philosophy, or whatever 
branch of knowledge teaches us about fairness.”81 The economics of rational 
markets, consumer welfare, and allocative efficiency simply leave no room or 
place for fairness considerations. 
Taken together, such diverse and multi-directional attacks have succeeded in 
rendering considerations of fairness more or less irrelevant to current antitrust 
analyses. A simple test will confirm this. Simply pick up any major antitrust 
textbook or treatise and look for the word “Fairness” in the Index. One either will 
not find the word or it will have only a trivial number of citations. As a primary 
example, the American Bar Association’s 1085-page ANTITRUST LAW 
DEVELOPMENTS (SEVENTH)82 does not list the term in its detailed and lengthy 
index.83 Nor will one find the term listed in the index of outstanding textbooks by 
distinguished antitrust scholars like Herbert Hovenkamp,84 Andrew Gavil, 
William E. Kovacic, and Jonathon B. Baker.85 A 2004 textbook by Professors 
Areeda, Kaplow, and Edlin includes “Fairness” in its index, and the brief 
discussion of “Fairness in economic behavior” initially concedes that “[s]ome 
kinds of unfair practices threaten to eliminate competition. . . .The control or 
elimination of this kind of unfairness is an essential part of any policy that would 
preserve competition.”86 Despite this seemingly important concession, the authors 
immediately added: “But fairness is a vagrant claim. . . .Competition itself is 
sometimes called unfair.”87 “Fairness” also is missing from the indices of cutting-
edge global competition textbooks by scholars like Einer Elhauge and Damien 
Geradin.88 
For the most part, the diverse critics of fairness as a relevant antitrust concept 
are ascendant today. Nevertheless, findings from the fields of evolutionary 
biology and behavioral economics are reopening the debate. 
B. The Case for Fairness as a Core Antitrust Principle 
Economists long have struggled over whether and how morality should be 
incorporated into economic analyses.89 Many economic theorists today try to 
 
81. Id. at 21. 
82. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (7th ed. 2012). 
83. Id. 
84. HOVENKAMP, supra note 38. 
85. GAVIL, ET AL, supra note 15. 
86. P. AREEDA, L. KAPLOW & A. EDLIN, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXTS, AND CASES 22 (6th 
ed. 2004). 
87. Id. ¶ 117(d) at 22. Furthermore, the brief discussion of “Fairness in economic behavior” appears 
almost as an afterthought in a short section titled “Other values of competition.” Id. ¶ 117 at 20. 
88. E. ELHAUGE & D. GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW & ECONOMICS (2d ed. 2011). These simple 
observations are not meant to in any way criticize the textbooks’ authors or place them in the camp of scholars 
disfavoring the use of “non-economic values” in antitrust analyses. 
89. FUKUYAMA, supra note 75, at 250. 
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portray economics as an objective values-free science that is “more like physics 
than sociology.”90 In presenting their economic theories as hard science, many 
neoclassical economists claim total independence from normative moral 
judgments such as fairness.91 Like the ancient Greek architect Hippodamus, these 
economists seek “to rise above the messy particulars of the city to suggest a unity 
founded on mathematical principles accessible only to the mind and not to 
eyes.”92 In so doing, however, they unsuccessfully seek to circumvent human 
nature.93 
Economics never has been and never will be free from or immune to 
normative values judgments.94 “Economic theorists have generally 
underestimated values as critical elements in human choice and behavior.”95 
Whether or not economists are willing to admit it, economics “is grounded in 
social life and cannot be understood separately from the larger question of how 
modern societies organize themselves.”96 “Economists like to refer to their 
standard model of human behavior as Homo economicus (‘economic man’).”97  
Unfortunately, “in scholarly rhetoric and public conception [the] imaginary 
Homo economicus has morphed into a cartoon version of himself, a heartless 
sociopath dominated by the ‘anti-value’ of selfishness.”98 
 
90. Hughes, supra note 34, at 280 (citing Whitney Cunningham, Note, Testing Posner’s Strong Theory 
of Wealth Maximization, 81 GEO. L.J. 141, 158 (1992). See also BORK, supra note 35, at 8 (“Basic 
microeconomic theory is of course a science, though like many other sciences it is by no means complete in all 
its branches. Were it not a science, rational antitrust policy would be impossible.”). 
91. See, e.g., Stucke, supra note 13, at 603 (quoting Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal 
Trade Commission and the Future Development of U.S. Competition Policy, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359, 
388) (“Antitrust finally regarded enhancing consumer welfare as the single unifying goal of competition policy, 
and it used a framework that was based on sound economics, both theoretical and empirical.”) See also R. 
Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the International Conference on Competition: 
Competition and Politics 7 (June 6, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/210522.pdf 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (warning that if competition authorities “incorporate extraneous social 
and political values into [their] decisionmaking,” then their “competition-based analysis will be polluted by 
values that, while important, just do not belong in sound competition analysis.”). 
92. ARLENE W. SAXONHOUSE, FEAR OF DIVERSITY: THE BIRTH OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN ANCIENT 
GREEK THOUGHT 209 (1992). 
93. EDWARD O. WILSON, THE SOCIAL CONQUEST OF EARTH 191 (2012); see also PAUL J. ZAK, THE 
MORAL MOLECULE: THE SOURCE OF LOVE AND PROSPERITY 209 (2012) (“In the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, economics tried to achieve scientific rigor by cutting off recognition of the human element of 
motives, expectations, and psychological uncertainties.”). 
94. See Horton, Competition or Monopoly?, supra note 19, at 201–205. “The history of the continuing 
debates as to antitrust legislation and regulation reveals that how people think about antitrust issues is generally 
tied to their underlying assumptions and premises, as well as their implied values.” Id. at 201. Stucke, supra 
note 13, at 604 (“Even if antitrust technocrats, for normative reasons, limit antitrust to economic goals, they 
cannot avoid noneconomic values.”). 
95. Oliver R. Goodenough, Values, Mechanism Design, and Fairness, in MORAL MARKETS: THE 
CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 228 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008). 
96. FUKUYAMA, supra note 9, at xiii. 
97. ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH: EVOLUTION, COMPLEXITY, AND THE RADICAL 
REMAKING OF ECONOMICS 116 (2006). 
98. Goodenough, supra note 95, at 228; see also Horton, Coming Extinction, supra note 19, at 519 
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Nor is there anything objective, scientific, or even consistent about the 
concept of consumer welfare, as applied by theorists. As  Professors Sokol and 
Blair note, “[t]he Supreme Court has left ambiguous whether consumer or total 
welfare should be used as the appropriate standard [in antitrust analysis].”99 And, 
as further observed by Professor Hovenkamp, “antitrust does not use welfare 
tests of any kind very consistently.”100 Although it sounds economically 
meaningful and impressive, consumer welfare may be “the most abused term in 
modern antitrust analysis.”101 At the very least, “no consensus exists on what 
consumer welfare actually means.”102 A series of International Competition 
Network (ICN) surveys “suggest that the phrase ‘promoting consumer welfare,’ 
provides little guidance as an antitrust goal.”103 
The concept of consumer welfare has been intricately tied to the concept of 
“‘rational self-interest,’ which assumes that each individual consumer makes 
decisions on the basis of personal advantage, and also on the basis of rational 
calculation as to exactly where that advantage lies.”104 But in seeking to 
completely divorce economics from societal norms and values, economists are in 
danger of turning into “moral zombies.”105 Economists’ consequentialism leaves 
no room for independent considerations of fairness.106 Indeed, studies have shown 
 
(quoting Lynn A. Stout, supra note 13, at 157, 158–59) (“In the end, ‘Homo economicus is a sociopath.’”). 
99. Blair & Sokol, supra note 12, at 476. The authors further argue that “the Supreme Court still does 
not quite understand the difference between welfare standards.” Id. at 479. As a result, “in surveying the 
Supreme Court’s modern opinions, a crystal clear identification of antitrust’s goal is as elusive as ever . . . . It is 
difficult to say just what the Court really means due to its misuse of terms that have precise meaning in 
economics.” Id. at 480. 
100. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 81 (2012). 
101. Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and 
Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1032 (1987); see also Maurice E. Stucke, Looking at 
Monopsony in the Mirror 35 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2094553 (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (“No consensus exists in the United States or globally on what consumer welfare actually means, 
who the consumers are, how to measure consumer welfare. . . or how to design legal standards to further this 
goal.”); Stucke, supra note 13, at 571–73. 
102. Stucke, supra note 13, at 571 (capitalizations omitted). See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 85 (4th ed. 2011) (noting the term’s 
ambiguity); Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133, 
134 (2010) (“[A]cademic confusion and thoughtless judicial borrowing led to the rise of a label [consumer 
welfare] that 30 years later has no clear meaning.”). 
103. Stucke, supra note 101, at 34 (citing 2007 ICN REPORT, at 3). The International Competition 
Network “provides competition authorities with a specialized yet informal venue for maintaining regular 
contacts and addressing practical competition concerns. This allows for a dynamic dialogue that serves to build 
consensus and convergence towards sound competition policy principles across the global antitrust 
community.” The ICN’s “mission statement is to advocate the adoption of superior standards and procedures in 
competition policy around the world, formulate proposals for procedural and substantive convergence, and seek 
to facilitate effective international cooperation to the benefit of member agencies, consumers and economies 
worldwide.” About Page, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, http://www.internationalcompetition 
network.org/about.aspx (last visited June 23, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
104. ZAK, supra note 22, at 7. 
105. Id. at 123. 
106. Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in American Philosophy of Law, in ON PHILOSOPHY IN 
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that undergraduates majoring in economics—unlike in any other academic 
major—“become less trusting and generous in experiments as they move from 
freshman to senior year.”107 
Worse yet, “consumer welfare” economics have failed field-testing in the 
antitrust arena over the last four decades.108 Extensive field-testing resulted from 
a “heavily funded effort, over two decades of private interest exaltation, to 
displace the founders’ republican arena of civic virtue and political engagement 
with the marketplace of economic self-interest.”109 Consumer welfare economics 
have “failed in [their] promise to provide the greatest good for the greatest 
number.”110 Dramatic increases in concentration111 have been accompanied by “a 
diminished sense of community and commonweal. . . .”112 It is fair to ask whether 
we have “lost touch with the notion of fair play.”113 
To establish and pursue effective antitrust policies in the coming decades, we 
must return to a deeper understanding of human nature. In so doing, we must pay 
close attention and deference to our evolutionary heritage.114 As explained by the 
great evolutionary biologist Edward O. Wilson, “[h]uman nature is the inherited 
regularities of mental development common to our species. They are the 
‘epigenetic rules,’ which evolved by the interaction of genetic and cultural 
evolution that occurred over a long period in deep prehistory.”115 
 
AMERICAN LAW 122, 124 (Francis J. Mootz III ed., 2009). 
107. ZAK, supra note 12, at 127. 
108. See, e.g., GAVIL, ET AL., supra note 15, at 38 (“contemporary U.S. antitrust analysis focuses almost 
exclusively on economic goals. . . .”); Markham, supra note 5, at 278 (“In the last two decades of the Twentieth 
Century, antitrust law embraced this narrow, Chicago School, doctrinal approach to antitrust law and accepted 
the optimization of allocative efficiency of firms and markets as the dominant antitrust policy.”). 
109. KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY 419 (2002). 
110. PETER CORNING, THE FAIR SOCIETY AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 169–70 (2011); see also 
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 260–
61 (2010) (attacking Chicago School economics); YVES SMITH, ECONNED: HOW ENLIGHTENED SELF INTEREST 
UNDERMINED DEMOCRACY AND CORRUPTED CAPITALISM 93–4 (2010) (condemning market assumptions of 
neoclassical economics); RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE 
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION xiv (2009) (discussing the economic crisis of 2008–09 and its origins and roots). 
111. See, e.g., KENNETH M. DAVIDSON, supra note 25; BARRY C. LYNN, THE NEW MONOPOLY 
CAPITALISM AND THE ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION 5 (2010); ADAMS & BROCK, supra note 25, at 6–7. 
112. KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY xiv (2002); see also Horton, Coming Extinction, 
supra note 19, at 517 (quoting FUKUYAMA, supra note 75, at 91) (“The rise of Homo economicus is 
synonymous with and symptomatic of the insidious increase of ‘moral minimalism,’ which has led to a 
dangerous ‘miniaturization of community.’”); id. (“The essence of the shift of values that is at the center of the 
Great Disruption is, then, the rise of moral individualism and the consequent miniaturization of community.”). 
113. CORNING, supra note 110, at 164 (discussing Stevens’ dissenting opinion in Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929 (2010)). 
114. ALBERT BORGMANN, REAL AMERICAN ETHICS: TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR OUR COUNTRY 77 
(2006) (“[E]volutionary theory reveals background conditions of the good life that we ignore to our 
detriment.”). 
115. WILSON, supra note 93, at 193; see also Ruse, supra note 5, at 47 (“Given a shared evolution, we 
humans have a shared insight—or rather, sense of insight—into the norms of right and wrong . . . .Ethics works 
and that is no small thing.”). 
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Fortunately, more and more economists and lawyers have begun recognizing 
and understanding how important it is to integrate and incorporate the various 
sciences into antitrust analyses, and started working to develop meaningful 
analogies between biological and economic systems.116 Economists have begun 
working towards a “consilience”117 with evolutionary biology, and are absorbing 
the learnings from a diverse array of fields, including psychology, neuroscience, 
and sociology.118 Many economists increasingly are realizing that evolutionary 
biology has a great deal to offer in understanding the complexity119 of human 
institutions and economies.120 Economists even have christened names like 
“evolutionary economics”121 and “complexity economics” for this emerging and 
burgeoning field.122 
Economist Michael Shermer defines evolutionary economics as “the study of 
the economy as an evolving complex adaptive system grounded in a human 
nature that evolved functional adaptations to survival as a social primate species 
in the Paleolithic epoch in which we evolved.”123 Evolutionary economics 
incorporates research and studies from the emerging fields of evolutionary 
psychology and evolutionary ethics. Philosophy professor Albert Borgmann 
notes: “. . . social science without ethics is aimless; ethics without social science 
is hollow.”124 
More and more often, evolutionary biologists, behavioral economists, and 
legal and business scholars are coming to appreciate how fundamental and 
critical humans’ innate sense of fairness has been to our long-term evolutionary 
 
116. See Horton, Coming Extinction, supra note 19, at 477. In fairness, some biologists began calling for 
such a consilience between different branches of the sciences many decades ago. DANIEL R. BROOKS & 
DEBORAH A. MCLENNAN, THE NATURE OF DIVERSITY: AN EVOLUTIONARY VOYAGE OF DISCOVERY 7 (2002) 
(quoting B. Moore, The Scope of Ecology, ECOLOGY 1 (1920), at 3–5). For example, ecologist B. Moore in 
1920 observed that “[m]any sciences have developed to the point where. . .contact and cooperation with related 
sciences are essential to full development.” Id. 
117. EDWARD O. WILSON, supra note 26, at 8–14 (calling for the synthesis of different sciences). 
118. See Horton, Coming Extinction, supra note 19, at 477. 
119. MARC GOERGEN, ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COMPLEXITY THEORY 4 (2010). “All 
human systems and institutions are complex in the sense that they are multidimensional with social, cultural, 
political, physical, technical, economic and other dimensions which interact and influence each other.” Id. 
120. See Horton, Antitrust Double Helix, supra note 19, at 635, 652 (2012); Bart Du Laing, Gene-
Culture, Co-Evolutionary Theory and the Evolution of Legal Behavior and Institutions, in LAW, ECONOMICS, 
AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 248, 264 (Peer Zumbansen & Gralf-Peter Calliess eds., 2011) (“[T]he time has 
come for evolutionary minded legal scholars to replenish from the original source, being biological 
evolutionary theory, as currently applied in a variety of ways to our own species.”). 
121. MICHAEL SHERMER, THE MIND OF THE MARKET: COMPASSIONATE APES, COMPETITIVE HUMANS, 
AND OTHER TALES FROM EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 3 (2008). 
122. ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH: EVOLUTION, COMPLEXITY, AND THE RADICAL 
REMAKING OF ECONOMICS 19 (2006). 
123. SHERMER, supra note 121, at 3. 
124. BORGMANN, supra note 114, at 15. Borgmann adds that within the field of ethics, “[t]heoretical 
ethics, practical ethics, and real ethics should be thought of not as rivals but as complements of one another.” Id. 
at 30. 
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and economic success. In the simple words of evolutionary biologist Edward O. 
Wilson: “we are learning the fundamental principle that ethics is everything.”125 
“The moral sense of fairness is hardwired into our brains and is an emotion 
shared by all people and primates tested for it.”126 Overwhelming evidence from 
numerous fields shows that our innate sense of fairness has evolved as part of an 
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), which helped ensure and maintain “social 
harmony in our ancestors’ small bands, where cooperation was reinforced and 
became the rule while freeloading was punished and became the exception.”127 
We have evolved to care deeply about the fairness of any exchange relationships 
and outcomes.128 
Throughout our evolutionary history, our long-term success has hinged upon 
our ability to work cooperatively and effectively in social groups.129 
Sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson observes that “selection between groups of 
humans typically promotes altruism among members of the community . . . 
colonies of cheaters lose to colonies of cooperators.”130 Consequently, “social 
intelligence,” which includes an innate sense of fairness, has been crucial to our 
 
125. WILSON, supra note 26, at 325; see also KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 23 
(1974) (“Trust is an important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to 
have a fair degree of reliance on other people’s word.”); FUKUYAMA, supra note 9, at 152 (“We often take a 
minimal level of trust and honesty for granted and forget that they pervade everyday economic life and are 
crucial to its smooth functioning.”); MICHAEL PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 9 (1980)  (arguing that shared 
value is a new way to achieve economic success and that in providing societal benefits, companies do not need 
to temper their economic success). 
126. SHERMER, supra note 121, at 11; see also MARK BEKOFF & JESSICA PIERCE, WILD JUSTICE, THE 
MORAL LIVES OF ANIMALS xii (2009) (“Cooperation, fairness, and justice have to be factored into the 
evolutionary equation in order to understand the evolution of social behavior in diverse species.”). “We believe 
that a sense of fairness or justice may function in chimpanzee society, and in a broad range of other animal 
societies as well.” Id. at 113. Sarah F. Brosnan, Fairness and Other-Regarding Preferences in Nonhuman 
Primates, in MORAL MARKETS, supra note 13, at 77, 79–80 (“Few would disagree that humans have a sense of 
fairness. We respond badly when treated unfairly; we give more than the minimum required in experimental 
games. . . . and we frequently punish in situations in which another individual behaves non-cooperatively. . . .To 
varying degrees, these inequity averse responses are seen across a vast array of cultures and differ significantly 
depending on the quality of the relationship between the individuals involved…They have recently been linked 
to emotional, as well as rational processes. . . .”). 
127. SHERMER, supra note 121, at 11. See also BEKOFF & PIERCE, supra note 126, at 134 (“Our 
informed guess would be that justice and a sense of fairness have evolved out of the more basic repertoire of 
cooperative and altruistic behavior.”). 
128. SHERMER, supra note 121, at 176. 
129. ZAK, supra note 22, at 69 (“During the millions of years of our development as social mammals, 
our individual survival depended on how well we fit in with the group, and group survival depended on how 
well each member cooperated.”); WILSON, SOCIAL CONQUEST, supra note 93, at 53 (“If we assume that groups 
[were] approximately equal to one another in weaponry and other technology, which has been the case for most 
of the time among primitive societies over hundreds of thousands of years, we can expect that the outcome of 
between-group competition [was] determined largely by the details of social behavior within each group in 
turn.”); MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 
141 (1996) (“[M]orality and other emotional habits pay. The more you behave in selfless and generous ways the 
more you can reap the benefits of cooperative endeavour from society.”). 
130. WILSON, supra note 93, at 162–63. 
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evolutionary success.131 Behaving fairly helped us fit within a group, and being 
part of a strong group had a “high fitness payoff.”132 
Our innate senses of justice and fairness evolved as part of our ability to 
thrive and succeed in social groups.133 Multidisciplinary studies confirm “that 
most of us do have a bias toward cooperation and a readiness to reciprocate—a 
sense of fairness.”134 Economists Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter have found that 
“humans get inordinately upset about unfairness, and will even forego immediate 
personal gain in order to punish a perceived injustice. . . .”135 In the words of 
primate biologist Sarah Brosnan: “. . . fairness counts. Both human and 
nonhuman primates dislike being treated inequitably, whether as a result of 
unequal distribution or an unfair partner.”136 Fairness serves as “a ‘golden thread’ 
that binds together a harmonious society.”137 
Philosophers have echoed biologists’ findings concerning our innate morality 
and sense of fairness. Philosopher John Rawls, for example, has argued that 
“everyone is a moral agent. . . .”138 Rawls presciently has warned that “American 
society has moved farther away from the idea of justice as fairness.”139 
Evolutionary biologist Edward O. Wilson similarly has described moral 
reasoning as “the vital glue of society.”140 Conservatives such as social scientist 
 
131. See WILSON, supra note 93, at 43–44 (“Carnivores at campsites are forced to behave in ways not 
needed by wanderers in the field. They must divide labor: some forage and hunt, others guard the campsite and 
the young. They must share food, both vegetable and animal, in ways that are acceptable to all. Otherwise, the 
bonds that bind them will weaken. . . . All of these pressures confer an advantage on those able to read the 
intention of others, grow in the ability to gain trust and alliance, and manage rivals. Social intelligence was 
therefore always at a high premium. A sharp sense of empathy can make a huge difference. . . .”). 
132. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BOEHM, MORAL ORIGINS: THE EVOLUTION OF VIRTUE, ALTRUISM, AND 
SHAME 114 (2012) (“For a number of reasons, individuals who better internalize their groups’ rules are more 
likely to succeed socially in life and thus be more successful in propagating their genes. . . .For humans, fitting 
in with your moral community has a high fitness payoff because being punished is costly to fitness, whereas 
having a good reputation can help fitness.”); SAXONHOUSE, supra note 92, at 211 (“[T]he Cretans understand 
the importance of sharing so that none feel excluded from involvement in the city.”). 
133. Id. 
134. CORNING, supra note 110, at 196. 
135. BEKOFF & PIERCE, supra note 126, at 114 (discussing E. Fehr & S. Gächter, Fairness and 
Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159–81 (2000)). 
136. Brosnan, supra note 13, at 99. 
137. CORNING, supra note 110, at 165. 
138. BORGMANN, supra note 114, at 142 (attributing the idea to John Rawls). 
139. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS 57 (2001). For an interesting analysis of Rawls’ discussions of 
fairness in the context of current political issues, see Benjamin Hale, The Veil of Opulence, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
12, 2012, 5:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/the-veil-of-opulence (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (“[T]he question of fairness has widespread application throughout our political 
discourse.”). 
140. EDWARD O. WILSON, THE FUTURE OF LIFE 151 (2002). Wilson explained: 
Moral reasoning is not a cultural artifact invented for convenience. It is and always has been the vital 
glue of society, the means by which transactions are made and honored to ensure survival. Every 
society is guided by ethical precepts, and every one of its members is expected to follow moral 
leadership and ethics-based tribal law. The propensity does not have to be beaten into us. Evidence 
exists instead of an instinct to behave ethically, or at least to insist on ethical behavior in others. 
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Francis Fukuyama141 and political scientist James Q. Wilson142 concur. 
Meanwhile, linguistics professor George Lakoff argues that American 
democratic institutions are based on essential moral norms such as fairness.143 
Economist Adam Smith recognized our senses of morality and fairness, and 
discussed them at length in his The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith 
“suggested that conscience and good behavior are inherent parts of our 
psychological makeup, and that they are elicited quite naturally from our social 
relationships.”144 Philosophy professor Robert C. Solomon argued that Smith’s 
discussion of natural sympathy “includes both the ability to feel with as well as 
for others, and it lies at the very foundation of our emotional lives and is the basis 
(though not the sole basis) of ethics.”145 
Charles Darwin was struck by the universality of humans’ sense of morals 
and conscience. “What his far-flung anthropological research project told him 
was that indigenous people everywhere did seem to blush with shame. And on 
this basis he could assume that, as an important aspect of our conscientious moral 
sense, human shame reactions surely had to have an innate basis.”146 Similarly, 
primate zoologists have observed how capuchin monkeys “carefully monitor 
equity and fair treatment among peers.”147 Similarly, “[a]mong chimpanzees, a 
 
Id. See also Horton, Coming Extinction, supra note 19, at 511 (“[M]orality provides the communal glue that 
holds our societies together.”). 
141. FUKUYAMA, GREAT DISRUPTION, supra note 75, at 231 (“[H]uman beings are by nature social 
creatures with certain built-in, natural capabilities for solving problems of social cooperation and inventing 
moral rules to constrain individual choice.”). 
142. JAMES Q. WILSON, ON CHARACTER: ESSAYS 192 (expanded ed. 1995) (“[P]eople everywhere have 
a natural moral sense that is not entirely the product of utility or convention.”); see also JAMES Q. WILSON, THE 
MORAL SENSE 2 (1993) (identifying the natural moral sense that is shared by humans and describing the origins 
of that moral sense). 
143. GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK 323 (2002). 
Professor Lakoff further argues that moral self-interest presupposes moral fairness in the form of fairness of 
competition. Id. 
144. ZAK, supra note 22, at 17; see also id. at 170; ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 
86 (1853) (“Society. . . cannot subsist among those who are at all times ready to hurt and injure one another. . . . 
Justice. . .is the main pillar that upholds. . . .”). 
145. See ROBERT C. SOLOMON, ETHICS AND EXCELLENCE: COOPERATION AND INTEGRITY IN BUSINESS 
86–87 (1992) (arguing that the “central thesis” of The Theory of Moral Sentiments was that “people are 
naturally cooperative and sympathetic, and that their self-interest naturally includes concern for others and their 
opinions.”); Larry Arnhart, Darwinian Conservatism, in PHILOSOPHY AFTER DARWIN: CLASSIC AND 
CONTEMPORARY READINGS 349–50 (Michael Ruse ed., 2009) (arguing that Adam Smith believed that we 
derived general rules of justice and injustice from our natural moral sentiments). 
146. BOEHM, supra note 132, at 14. Boehm added: 
“This research project stands today as a true landmark in the anthropological science of human 
nature, and what it suggested more generally was that conscience and morality had to have evolved, 
in the biological sense of the word . . . . [I]t evolved for specific reasons having to do with the 
Pleistocene environments humans had to cope with prehistorically and, more specifically, with their 
growing ability to use group punishment to better their own social and subsistence lives and create 
more socially equalized societies.” 
Id. at 14–15. 
147. BEKOFF & PIERCE, supra note 126, at 6. They add: “Individuals who are shortchanged during a 
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rudimentary sense of right and wrong, related to what serves their group’s 
common good, plays a crucial role in maintaining a chimpanzee group’s 
integrity. . . .”148 
As part of our innate instinct for fairness, humans have evolved sophisticated 
behavioral mechanisms for encouraging others to cooperate, and to punish or 
retaliate against those who cheat or try to free-ride.149 Anthropological biologist 
Christopher Boehm asserts that human cooperation is buttressed and 
strengthened through “the application of positive social pressure on adults to 
behave with generosity, and by the discouragement (or elimination) of selfish 
bullies and cheaters, who hamper cooperation and also create conflict.”150 Both 
primates and humans have shown a strong willingness to incur costs in order to 
punish those who act unfairly or seek to free ride.151 Furthermore, humans are 
willing to engage not only in direct reciprocation, but in indirect reciprocation as 
well through a willingness to retaliate on behalf of third parties.152 Such 
punishment can help reform non-cooperators, and turn them into fair 
cooperators.153 “Indeed, men even seem to get a burst of pleasure—or at least 
reward activation—when they punish a norm violator. . . .”154 
 
bartering transaction by being offered a less preferred treat refuse to cooperate with researchers. In a nutshell, 
the capuchins expert to be treated fairly.” Id. 
148. Egbert Giles Leigh, Jr., Adaptation, Adaptationism, and Optimality, in ADAPTATIONISM AND 
OPTIMALITY 358, 381 (S. H. Orzack & E. Sober eds. 2001). See generally FRANS DEWAAL, GOOD NATURED: 
THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS (1996). 
149. See M. DALY & M. WILSON, HOMICIDE 256 (1988). Daly and Wilson argue: 
From the perspective of evolutionary psychology, this almost mystical and seemingly irreducible 
sort of moral imperative is the output of a mental mechanism with a straightforward adaptive 
function: to reckon justice and administer punishment by a calculus which ensures that violators reap 
no advantage from their misdeeds. The enormous volume of mystico-religious bafflegab about 
atonement and penance and divine justice and the like is the attribution to higher, detached authority 
of what is actually a mundane, pragmatic matter: discouraging self-interested competitive acts by 
reducing their profitability to nil. 
Id. 
150. BOEHM, supra note 132, at 11; see also PAUL SEABRIGHT, THE COMPANY OF STRANGERS: A 
NATURAL HISTORY OF ECONOMIC LIFE 33 (2010) (“Two kinds of disposition have proved important to our 
evolution: a capacity for rational calculation of costs and benefits of cooperation, and a tendency for what has 
been called strong reciprocity—the willingness to repay kindness with kindness and betrayal with revenge, 
even when this is not what rational calculation would recommend.”). 
151. See, e.g., BEKOFF & PIERCE, supra note 126, at 114 (arguing that “humans get inordinately upset 
about fairness, and will even forego an immediate personal gain in order to punish a perceived injustice”); 
KARL SIGMUND, THE CALCULUS OF SELFISHNESS 15-17 (2010). 
152. SIGMUND, supra note 151, at 15. 
153. Id; see also id. at 22 (“[T]he instinct of revenge, frowned upon as base, can play a useful economic 
role by deterring defectors. . . .”); MARTIN A. NOWAK, SUPER COOPERATORS: ALTRUISM, EVOLUTION, AND 
WHY WE NEED EACH OTHER TO SUCCEED 59 (2011) (“If our players see each other again and again, 
cooperation can emerge because “rational players must weigh the benefit of exploiting the other player in the 
first round against the cost of forfeiting collaboration in future rounds.”). 
154. SHERMER, supra note 121, at 186. Shermer adds that “brain scans have shown high activity in the 
NAcc reward center[,] . . .which is fueled by dopamine.” Id.; see also ZAK, supra note 93, at 38 (discussing 
importance of “feel-good neurotransmitters: dopamine and serotonin”); SEABRIGHT, supra note 150, at 68 
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In light of our fairness calculus, we are “exquisitely tuned into the body 
language, facial expressions, and tone of voice of those around us. . . .”155 This 
has given us a strong hereditary tendency to detect cheaters.156 Sociobiologist 
Edward O. Wilson has noted how the forces of evolutionary group selection 
placed an “enormous advantage” upon a “group with members who could read 
intentions and cooperate among themselves while predicting the actions of 
competing groups.”157 
Our minds have developed a “special cheater-detection module, which makes 
us highly sensitive to norms regulating reciprocal exchanges” and the need to 
punish cheating.158 When we detect cheating or free riding, we instinctively react 
with anger and “intense moral outrage.”159 A group’s “shared moral outrage” can 
become so potent and powerful “that simply by its threat could deter many a 
potential deviant.”160 Firmly grounded in our hereditary neurobiology, our sense 
of shared moral outrage helps ensure that cooperation will outcompete cheating 
 
(“[S]ubjects given an opportunity to punish others for what they perceive as ‘unfair’ behavior tend to have 
particularly strong activation in an area of the brain known as the caudate nucleus, which is associated with 
pleasurable rewards (and is known to be activated by substances such as cocaine and nicotine.”)); Ming Hsu, 
Cedric Anen & Steven R. Quartz, The Right and the Good: Distributive Justice and Neural Encoding of Equity 
and Efficiency, 23 SCIENCE 1092 (2008) (discussing the importance of fairness in emotional processing). 
155. BEKOFF & PIERCE, supra note 126, at 90. The authors further note how “[a]nimals living in social 
groups can benefit from being sensitive to the emotional states of other group members. Emotional contagion 
might, for example, facilitate defensive action in light of threat. . . . But joy, excitement, curiosity, and intense 
interest can spread quickly as well.” Id. at 91. 
156. WILSON, supra note 140, at 151; see also EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF 
KNOWLEDGE 186–87 (1999) (observing that in humans, “one capacity, the detection of cheating, is developed to 
exceptional levels of sharpness and rapid calculation. . . . More than error, more than good deeds, and more 
even than the margin of profit, the possibility of cheating by others attracts attention”). 
157. WILSON, supra note 93, at 224. Wilson adds that as part of our “ability to collaborate for the 
purpose of achieving shared goals and intentions. . . . We have become the experts at mind reading . . . .We 
express our intentions as appropriate to the moment and read those of others brilliantly. . . .” Id. at 226. 
158. See WOJCIECH ZALUSKI, EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY xiv (2009). 
159. WILSON, supra note 140, at 151; see also WILSON, supra note 26, at 186–87 (observing that 
detection of cheating “excites emotion and serves as the principal source of hostile gossip and moralistic 
aggression by which the integrity of the political economy is maintained.”). 
160. BOEHM, supra note 132, at 177. It is interesting to note that moral outrage originates in the left side 
of our brain while our thoughts about rational rules originate in the right side. Consequently, the concepts of 
fairness and legality reveal a deep dualism. Fairness is thus in many ways considered more of a sacred than a 
rational belief. Gregory S. Berns, Director, Center for Neuropolicy, Emory Univ., Address at the 13th Soc’y 
Evolutionary Analysis in Law Scholarship Conference: Neuroimaging of Sacred Values (April 20, 2012); see 
also Gregory S. Berns et al., The Price of Your Soul: Neural Evidence for the Non-Utilitarian Representation of 
Sacred Values, 367 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. B 754, 755 (2012) (“Functional resonance imaging (fMRI) has 
emerged as a viable tool to measure brain regions associated with different aspects of decision-making, and the 
growing literature on the neural correlates of moral judgment has demonstrated that deontic and utilitarian 
processing are associated with different brain regions. . . .”); Jorge Moll & Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Moral 
Judgments, Emotions and the Utilitarian Brain, 11(8) TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCES 319, 321 (2007) 
(“[E]motion and cognition (or reason) have mutually competing roles in moral judgment. Utilitarian choices in 
difficult moral dilemmas arise from cognitive control mechanisms based in the DLPFC, whereas non-utilitarian 
choices emerge from emotional responses relying on the medial PFC.”).  
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within our social groups and maximize our groups’ evolutionary fitness.161 
Biologist and mathematician Roger A. Nowak posits that: “if conscience and 
empathy were impediments to the advancement of self-interest, then we would 
have evolved to be amoral sociopaths. But we have not.”162 
Our potential for intense shared moral outrage can encourage better behavior 
and fairness in social dealings. More than anything else, people fear public 
ridicule.163 “Studies have shown that any sort of priming with the sense of being 
watched can induce better behavior.”164 Martin Nowak sees reputation as a 
powerful force that can be effectively exploited to ensure good behavior and 
fairness in reciprocal dealings.165 Similarly, Jane Jacobs has documented that the 
most effective way to keep “the public peace” in cities is not primarily through 
the police, but “by an intricate, almost unconscious, network of voluntary 
controls and standards among the people themselves, and enforced by the people 
themselves.”166 Indeed, in the animal kingdoms of social animals, “rule breakers 
are the outliers, the exceptions to the norm.”167 
Experiments and findings from the burgeoning field of behavioral economics 
buttress the teachings of evolutionary biology. A growing body of behavioral 
economics literature “has increasingly recognized and measured how . . . people 
will incur costs to punish unfair behavior, and care about treating others, and 
being treated fairly. . . .”168 Behavioral economists also point to examples 
 
161. See BORGMANN, supra note 114, at 142 (“[T]he good society will not come about through the 
forceful imposition of a sly engineering elite. It needs the conversation and sanction of ordinary people.”). 
162. NOWAK, supra note 153, at 89–90; see also SEABRIGHT, supra note 150, at 68 (“Strong reciprocity 
has now been convincingly documented in a wide array of groups of experimental subjects and across a wide 
range of human societies.”). 
163. See ZAK, supra note 22, at 184–85. 
164. Id. at 150; see also NOWAK, supra note 153, at 216 (“Just the thought that we are being observed is 
very persuasive. One can even think of conscience, our inner sense of right and wrong, as a gauge of how we 
will be viewed by others.”); SIGMUND, supra note 151, at 13 (“Psychologists have devised ingenious 
experiments to document that our concern of being observed is easily aroused. . . .Incidentally, it seems that test 
persons react the same, whether one or several persons are watching. This shows that they believe, at least 
subconsciously, that news will spread through gossip. One witness is enough.”). 
165. NOWAK, supra note 153, at 219 (“Whenever individual behavior is relevant to the public good, it 
should itself be made public to help avert tragedy.”). 
166. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 32–40 (1992); see also 
SEABRIGHT, supra note 150, at 8 (discussing how “[e]ffective institutions rely on a minimum of outside 
supervision, knowing that a little outside supervision can make natural incentives go a long ways”). 
167. BEKOFF & PIERCE, supra note 126, at 58; see also id. at 5 (“[P]articular patterns of behavior seem 
to constitute a kind of animal morality. Mammals living in tight social groups appear to live according to codes 
of conduct, including both prohibitions against certain kinds of behavior and expectations for other kinds of 
behavior. . . . Some animals seem to have a sense of fairness in that they understand and behave according to 
implicit rules about who deserves what and when. Individuals who breach rules of fairness are often punished 
either through physical retaliation or social ostracism.”). 
168. Maurice E. Stucke, The Implications of Behavioral Antitrust 1, available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2109713 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 
2006 COL. BUS. L. REV. 444, 515–16 (2006) (quoting Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game 
Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 1283 (1993)) (“[M]uch anecdotal evidence suggests that 
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documenting “the fear of informal sanctions from peers and social disapproval 
generally.”169 Game theory has “shown unequivocally that mutual benefits are an 
essential requisite for a viable social contract.”170 In addition, cheating in 
economic experiments is sharply reduced by plausible threats of revenge.171 
What does the evolutionary importance of fairness mean for antitrust? It 
demonstrates that for antitrust to ultimately be meaningful and effective, it must 
be grounded in moral norms of fairness, and not eschew or seek to eliminate 
fairness as “a vagrant claim.”172 Morality and fairness are the essential glues that 
hold our society together.173 Therefore, they must be the essential glue holding the 
antitrust laws together. We simply cannot continue pretending that we can make 
economic decisions in a moral vacuum. 
In honoring fairness, however, do we not create an antitrust policy “at war 
with itself,” as alleged by Robert Bork?174 The simple answer is no. Bork’s 
Antitrust Paradox has missed the most basic of biological tenets.175 Human 
evolution has always involved a delicate balancing of our group norms of 
fairness and cooperation with our selfish instincts.176 Primate biologist Frans 
DeWaal, for example, concedes that on the one hand evolution has produced a 
selfish psychology, but that it is balanced by “an unselfish psychology that in the 
long run has served us and these other social primates because they live in groups 
and they survive by mutual aid and cooperation.”177 Fairness and morality help 
humans negotiate and reconcile our conflicting evolutionary traits. As further 
described by Edward O. Wilson: 
[A]n iron rule exists in genetic social evolution. It is that selfish 
individuals beat altruistic individuals, while groups of altruists beat 
groups of selfish individuals. The victory can never be complete; the 
 
people sacrifice substantial amounts of money to reward or punish kind or unkind behavior.”). 
169. Stucke, supra note 168, at 515. 
170. CORNING, supra note 110, at 164. 
171. Horton, Antitrust Double Helix, supra note 19, at 656; see also SEABRIGHT, supra note 150, at 68. 
172. See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 6, at 21. 
173. See supra notes 125–128. 
174. BORK, supra note 35. 
175. Id. 
176. See, e.g., Horton, Coming Extinction, supra note 19, at 519–20 (“[T]hroughout our history, we 
always have had to balance our innate aggressive tendencies with our social morals and senses of fairness and 
reciprocity.”); see also BOEHM, supra note 132, at 114–15 (“I’ve already suggested that group rules should not 
be internalized so strongly that you’d be free of any temptation to break them, for many of the prohibitions that 
human groups arrive at are designed to curtail the same selfish behaviors— that —in smaller doses—can help 
individuals to advance their reproductive success.”). 
177. SHERMER, supra note 121, at 173 (quoting a personal interview with Frans DeWaal). Economist 
Paul J. Zak argues that in humans, “oxytocin maintains the balance between self and other, trust and distrust, 
approach and withdrawal.” ZAK, supra note 22, at 66; see also SEABRIGHT, supra note 150, at 288 (“[H]uman 
propensity to ‘truck, barter and exchange’ has always coexisted uneasily with a rival temptation to take, bully, 
and extort.”). 
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balance of selection pressures cannot move to either extreme. If 
individual selection were to dominate, societies would dissolve. If group 
selection were to dominate, human groups would come to resemble ant 
colonies.178 
Wilson further observes: 
[W]e can expect a continuing conflict between components of behavior 
favored by individual selection and those favored by group selection. 
Selection at the individual level tends to create competitiveness and 
selfish behavior among group members—in status, mating, and the 
securing of resources. In opposition, selection between groups tends to 
create selfless behavior, expressed in greater generosity and altruism, 
which in turn promote stronger cohesion and strength of the group of the 
whole.179 
The goal is not to eliminate rational self-interested economic behavior.180 It is 
understood that such behavior can promote the interests of the group through 
invention and entrepreneurship. The problem today, however, is that we have 
moved so far towards the path of laissez-faire free markets that we are in danger 
of social disintegration.181 We need to rediscover and celebrate our moral 
bearings.182 
 
178. WILSON, supra note 93, at 243. 
179. Id. at 273–74. Wilson further observes that “[a]n inevitable result of the mutually offsetting forces 
of multilevel selection is permanent ambiguity in the individual human mind, leading to countless scenarios in 
the way they bond, love, affiliate, betray, share, sacrifice, steal, deceive, redeem, punish, appeal, and adjudicate. 
The struggle endemic to each person’s brain, mirrored in the vast superstructure of cultural evolution, is the 
fountainhead of the humanities.” Id. at 274; see also BORGMANN, supra note 114, at 78 (“[W]e can be a violent 
tribe and need to curb that inclination through friendship and justice . . . .”). 
180. It is important to note that unfettered greed is not only unnecessary, but ultimately destructive to a 
healthy economic ecosystem. As previously observed by this author, “Chicagoans fundamentally overlook that 
societal trust is corrosively eroded by the selfishness that Homo economicus wears as a badge of honor.” 
Horton, Antitrust Double Helix, supra note 19, at 517. Indeed, economist Michael Shermer notes that “our dual 
propensities for good and evil can be dramatically tweaked one way or the other depending on the situation and 
the system.” SHERMER, supra note 121, at 210. Shermer adds this chilling note: 
Because we evolved to be such social beings, we are hypersensitive to what others think about us, 
and we are strongly motivated to conform to the social norms of the group. . . .When order breaks 
down, when the rules are no longer enforced, when the normal institutional brakes on evil are lifted, 
evil is facilitated through the contagious excitement of the group’s actions, through the unchecked 
momentum of the smaller bad steps that came before, and ultimately permission for evil is granted 
by the system at large . . . .Here we find an example of moral path dependency, in which moral 
systems and behavior become dependent on the rules of the corporate environment, or become 
locked into the channels of moral patterns exhibited by others in the environment. Thus, an 
environment of moral corporate philosophy and leaders establishes a situation that can either 
accentuate the good disposition of employees or bring out the bad. 
Id. at 212–15. 
181. See, e.g., FUKUYAMA, supra note 75, at 91 (“The essence of the shift in values that is at the center 
of the Great Disruption is, then, the rise of moral individualism and the consequent miniaturization of 
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Antitrust professor Daniel Sokol, troubled by the “few moral penalties that 
cartelists at either [the] individual or firm level internalize in their risk/reward 
calculation,” has called for an increase in our shared moral outrage.183 Similarly, 
Michael Porter and Mark R. Kramer desire “a more sophisticated form of 
capitalism, one imbued with a social purpose.”184 Antitrust professor Maurice E. 
Stucke likewise has argued forcefully and with clarion urgency for the 
implementation of a progressive antitrust policy that better “balance[s] multiple 
political, social, moral, and economic objectives.”185 
Rather than leaving the market to itself to inevitably correct its shortcomings, 
we need a system of laws, norms, and markets that are integrated and work 
together to promote economic welfare for all.186 Antitrust scholars and jurists 
need to reconnect with the deep evolutionary human instinct and longing for 
basic fairness.187 Fairness is not inconsistent with economic utility or consumer 
welfare. Indeed, one can argue that fairness may be one of the most important 
aspects of economic utility, especially given the expansive natures of utility and 
welfare.188 Professor Maurice E. Stucke has argued that “[a]ntitrust law is at its 
strongest when it focuses on preserving an effective competitive process and 
 
community.”); Horton, Antitrust Double Helix, supra note 19, at 517 (“The rise of Homo economicus is 
synonymous with and symptomatic of the insidious increase in America of ‘moral minimalism,’ which has led 
to a dangerous ‘miniaturization of community.’”). 
182. See, e.g., BEKOFF & PIERCE, supra note 126, at 106 (“When human societies disintegrate and the 
social fabric becomes damaged, people often lose their moral bearings.”). 
183. D. Daniel Sokol, Cartels, Corporate Compliance, and What Practitioners Really Think About 
Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 201, 216–19 (2012). Sokol explains: “Culture can be used as a tool to improve 
compliance as a law-abiding culture creates norms that push for more effective compliance. Moral outrage and 
shame have a place in cartel enforcement as it creates its own form of deterrence. The greater society’s moral 
outrage at cartel behavior, the costlier undertaking such actions will be for individuals.” Id. at 26. 
184. Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent Capitalism—and 
Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 77. 
185. Stucke, supra note 13, at 624; see also Horton, Coming Extinction, supra note 19, at 522 (“In order 
to best protect the economy, policy-makers should increasingly look to the evolutionary moral values of fairness 
and reciprocity in analyzing and punishing predatory and exclusionary acts by dominant firms and monopolists, 
and stop unsuccessfully trying to rely upon inflexible quantitative models to justify dangerous predatory 
economic behavior.”). 
186. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 454–55 
(2000). Schuck states: “Norms are essential to both effective law and efficient markets. . . .Norms support 
markets by reducing transaction costs such as information and enforcement, by encouraging traders to deal 
fairly with one another, and by providing an alternative to inefficient and unfair legal regulation.” Id. at 435. 
187. See LAKOFF, supra note 143, at 323 (arguing that moral self-interest presupposes moral fairness “in 
the form of fairness of competition.”). 
188. See, e.g., James W. Brock & Norman P. Obst, Market Concentration, Economic Welfare, and 
Antitrust Policy, 2007 J. IND. COMPET. TRADE, Vol. 9, No. 1 69 (“[E]conomists have long construed ‘consumer 
welfare’ and ‘consumer utility’ in broad terms encompassing what individuals value, rather than narrowly 
limiting the concept to the production of goods and services alone.”); Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture, in THE 
ESSENCE OF BECKER 649 (R. Febrero & P. S. Schwartz eds., 1995) (arguing that microeconomic theory must 
incorporate “a much richer class of attitudes, preferences, and calculations.”); GARY S. BECKER, THE 
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5 (1976) (asserting that individual preferences must be construed 
in broader terms encompassing “fundamental aspects of life”). 
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enforcing norms of free, fair, and open competition.”189 Some competition 
enforcement officials outside the United States agree. A recent ICN survey 
covering the objectives of countries prohibiting monopolistic behavior found that 
a key emerging objective was promoting fairness.190 Similarly, behavioral 
economist Colin Camerer and his co-authors have found that people throughout 
the world have a set of consistent social preferences that include “fairness and 
reciprocity.”191 
Trustworthiness is crucial to effective economic outcomes. By increasing the 
sense that our competitive economy operates openly and fairly, we will increase 
our level of societal trust.192 Indeed, strong reciprocity, fairness, and the trust they 
create can help make our third-party enforcement mechanisms such as the 
Federal Trade Commission, the Antitrust Division, and our courts more 
credible.193 Instead of so-called “consumer welfare” and “allocative efficiency” 
economics, we should look increasingly to what economist Michael Shermer 
calls “virtue economics.”194 Virtue economics incorporates the overwhelming 
evidence from evolutionary biology and economics that “shows that fairness 
evolved as a stable strategy for maintaining social harmony in our ancestors’ 
small bands. . . .”195 Rather than ask reason and logic to replace and substitute for 
 
189. Stucke, supra note 168, at 36. 
190. INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, REPORT ON THE OBJECTIVES OF UNILATERIAL CONDUCT LAWS, 
ASSESSMENT OF DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER, AND STATE-CREATED MONOPOLIES ANNEX A 
(2007); see also Stucke, supra note 13, at 567. 
191. JOSEPH HENRICH, ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN SOCIALITY 8 (2004). The authors add that 
people “are willing to change the distribution of material outcomes among others at a personal cost to 
themselves, and reward those who act in a pro-social manner while punishing those who do not, even when 
those actions are costly.” Id.; see also SHERMER, supra note 121, at 189. 
192. See, e.g., ZAK, supra note 22, at xix (“What matters most in determining economic outcomes is 
actually trustworthiness—a moral consideration.”); HAIM OFEK, SECOND NATURE: ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF 
HUMAN EVOLUTION 1 (2001) (“[E]xchange relies on mutual trust: predictable codes of conduct agreeable to the 
human sense of morality.”). 
193. See SEABRIGHT, supra note 150, at 69 (“Even when third-party enforcement mechanisms (such as 
the courts) do play a role in strengthening the web of trust, strong reciprocity is the glue that makes these 
mechanisms credible.”); ZALUSKI, supra note 158, at xii (“[A]ll types of law—both primitive and modern 
law—can be viewed as an expression of our natural cooperative dispositions and as a mechanism supporting 
them and extending their scope. . . .evolutionary theory can or may help define the goals of law, that is, to select 
the principal values to be realized by law.”). 
194. SHERMER, supra note 121, at 12. 
195. Id. at 11; see also DEIDRE MCCLOSKEY, BOURGEOIS DIGNITY: WHY ECONOMICS CAN’T EXPLAIN 
THE MODERN WORLD 450 (2010) (recognizing the need for “a new science of history and the economy” that 
values “all the virtues”); see also ZAK, supra note 22, at 209. Zak observes: 
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, economics tried to achieve scientific rigor by cutting off 
recognition of the human element of motives, expectations, and psychological uncertainties. 
Fortunately, behavioral economics, and now neuroeconomics, has put us back on what I consider the 
right track, which is a path that combines both rigor and moral perspective. 
Id. 
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human emotion, which they cannot do, they can help us harness our deep-seated 
evolutionary instincts such as fairness.196 
Critics will argue that incorporating norms of fairness into antitrust analyses 
will introduce a level of complexity and uncertainty that will chill and stifle 
businesses’ aggressiveness and competitiveness.197 After all, business people 
crave “‘simple rules,’ i.e., objectives or policies that frame self-organizing at the 
business level.”198 But what could be simpler than asking businesspersons to tap 
into their instinctive evolutionary norms of fairness in conducting competitive 
economic activities?199 Indeed, there is a strong moral imperative for businesses 
to understand their social and economic impact.200 
Furthermore, as this author previously has argued, jurors and juries are 
ideally equipped from an evolutionary standpoint to apply their strongly 
ingrained norms of fairness in evaluating businesses’ conduct.201 The primary 
reason that distinguishing predatory from pro-competitive conduct is currently an 
allegedly “difficult business”202 is that poorly defined economic concepts like 
“consumer welfare” and “allocative efficiency” are instinctively and intuitively 
meaningless to the average human (including this author) and their anti-
democratic abuse has helped generate repugnant norms of selfishness and 
unfairness. But every American citizen can call upon his fairness instincts in 
evaluating business conduct.203 
Reviving antitrust jury trials also will reignite some of the “moral outrage” 
missing today in American antitrust, and “help restore and revitalize a valuable 
and necessary community-based investment in our antitrust laws and their 
 
196. See SEABRIGHT, supra note 150, at 72 (“An alternative view has taken shape in recent years, in 
which reason orders human social life not by replacing human emotion but by harnessing it.”). 
197. See e.g. M. GOERGEN, ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COMPLEXITY THEORY 96 (2010). 
198. M. GOERGEN, ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COMPLEXITY THEORY 96 (2010). 
199. See supra notes 167–68. 
200. See, e.g., Christopher Meyer & Julia Kirby, Runaway Capitalism, HARV. BUS. REV. 67, 75 (Jan.–
Feb. 2012) (“Those of us who believe capitalism can adapt and should not succumb to the excesses that are 
crippling it will keep looking for the new markers of fitness and sharing the new rules.”); GOERGEN, ET AL., 
supra note 198, at 104 (“[T]here is a moral imperative for organizations to understand their social and 
environmental impact.”); Robert C. Solomon, Business Ethics, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 354, 358 (Peter 
Singer ed., 1991) (“However competitive a particular industry may be, it always rests on a foundation of shared 
interests and mutually agreed-upon rules of conduct, and the competition takes place not in a jungle but in a 
community which it presumably both serves and depends upon.”). 
201. See Horton, Antitrust Double Helix, supra note 19, at 650–68; Horton, Coming Extinction, supra 
note 19, at 522. 
202. A. A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396, 1400 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.). 
203. See STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 71 (2002) 
(arguing that economic forces cannot be understood “without taking into account the thought processes of flesh-
and-blood people”); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit 
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AMER. ECON. REV. 728, 737, 740 (1986) (discussing consumers’ 
fundamental perceptions of fairness and “unfair exploitations of market power” and how they should impact 
business firms’ “incentive[s] to frame the terms of exchanges so as to make them appear ‘fair.’”). 
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enforcement.”204 Antitrust juries applying collective evolutionary norms of 
fairness will help us “exert collective self-control over the innate impulses that 
support injustice and make changes in what are considered acceptable norms.”205 
And the flexibility of their potential responses will enhance, rather than diminish, 
the health of our economic system.206 In the prescient words of Alfred E. Kahn: 
“The essential task of public policy in a free enterprise system should be to 
preserve the framework of a fair field and no favors,207 letting the results take care 
of themselves.”208 
C. Developing a Workable Fairness Standard 
Antitrust jurists, scholars, and enforcers should pay increased attention and 
deference not only to evolutionary norms of fairness, but to anticompetitive 
intent and competitive harm, including harm to competitors. Turning first to 
intent, this author and others have argued that “[a]s a function of our robust 
moral capacities, we are well-equipped, from an evolutionary and social 
perspective, to fairly evaluate the predatory intent of dominant firms and 
monopolists.”209 We should therefore allow juries to fully assess evidence of 
anticompetitive intent in judging predatory and anticompetitive behavior.210 
 
204. See Horton, Antitrust Double Helix, supra note 19, at 651; LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING 
CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 238–40 (2011) (discussing how societal norms of 
fairness and prosocial behavior are both common in, and necessary for, an efficient market economy). 
205. CORNING, supra note 110, at 187. 
206. See, e.g., GOERGEN, ET AL., supra note 198, at 79 (“In the corporate governance and the finance 
fields, a diversity of local response is a sign of health. . . .”); FUKUYAMA, supra note 9, at 502 (“There is no 
necessary trade-off…between community and efficiency; those who pay the most attention to community may 
indeed become the most efficient of all.”). 
207. Economists have increasingly become aware that business “success depends far more on the 
vagaries of chance than most people once imagined. And so does failure.” ROBERT H. FRANK, THE DARWIN 
ECONOMY: LIBERTY, COMPETITION AND THE COMMON GOOD 143 (2011); see also MALCOLM GLADWELL, 
OUTLIERS: THE STORY OF SUCCESS 32–33 (2008). Gladwell writes: 
We prematurely write off people as failures. We are too much in awe of those who succeed and far 
too dismissive of those who fail. . . .And why? Because we cling to the idea that success is a simple 
function of individual merit and that the world in which we all grow up and the rules we choose to 
write as a society don’t matter at all. 
Id. By ensuring that economic competition is fair, and by not allowing dominant firms to unfairly crush rivals, 
we will maximize the opportunities for long-term success catalyzed by economic diversity and opportunity.  
208. Alfred E. Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Performance, in MONOPOLY POWER AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE, supra note 61, at 177; see also STEPHEN JAY GOULD, FULL HOUSE: THE SPREAD OF 
EXCELLENCE FROM PLATO TO DARWIN 112 (1996) (arguing that consistent and reasonable rules of fairness 
have pushed excellence in baseball closer and closer to humans’ innate limitations). 
209. See Horton, Antitrust Double Helix, supra note 19, at 654–55. This author explains: 
Humans have developed keen abilities to quickly figure out who can be trusted in ongoing economic 
interactions. “Brain imaging seems to support the view that part of our cortex is specialized to deal 
with the ceaseless computations required to keep count of what we give and what we receive, and to 
respond emotionally to perceived imbalance.” In other words, humans are evolutionarily hard-wired 
to quickly judge others’ intentions. 
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Addressing next the issue of harm to competition,  “the destruction of 
competitors by dominant-firm predatory conduct and aggressive mergers are 
harmful external constraints on the natural growth of economic variation, 
diversity, and complexity.”211 The glib knee-jerk reaction of neoclassical 
economics is that the antitrust laws allegedly “protect competition, and not 
competitors.”212 As previously documented by this author, however, this 
normative cliché is unsupported by history, judicial precedent, and evolutionary 
theory.213 Guarding competitors against unfair and predatory competition by 
cartels, dominant firms, and monopolies is crucial to protecting the competitive 
diversity and variety necessary for a stable, thriving, and innovation-oriented 
economic ecosystem. 
It is therefore recommended that antitrust tribunals and regulators begin 
applying an evolutionary based analysis, which focuses on fairness, intent, and 
competitive harm. The potential application of such a series of considerations is 
discussed in Section III below. 
III. POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF FAIRNESS NORMS IN ANTITRUST CASES 
This section discusses the potential application of an evolutionary-based 
fairness/intent/competitive harm paradigm, and how it would differ from a 
“consumer welfare” economic approach in key cases. Part A examines false 
negatives in recent Supreme Court predatory pricing cases and analyzes them 
 
Humans have to be good at reading others’ intentions because our evolutionary development of 
languages has dramatically increased the opportunities for manipulation and deception when we seek 
to cooperate with others. We understand “that a mix of cooperators (law-abiding citizens) and 
defectors (criminals) will always persist in human societies.” Consequently, we have developed 
acute sensitivities towards others’ intentions. We are therefore evolutionarily well-equipped to 
meaningfully evaluate and react to others’ maxims and intentions. 
The reason that juries have been “impressed” by evidence of predatory intent is that such evidence 
strikes deep evolutionary chords. On the other hand, the so-called rational Chicago/Harvard 
economic models that eschew fairness and intent lack meaningful biological, evolutionary, or 
historical foundations. Consequently, we should welcome evidence and information about the 
motivations and intentions that lie behind the actions of dominant firms and monopolists. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Maurice E. Stucke, Is Intent Relevant? 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 452, 857 
(2006) available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1992761 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Contrary to 
some jurists’ arguments, premised on neo-classical economic theory, intent matters. People rely on intent in 
assessing the conduct’s reasonableness.”). 
210. See Horton, Antitrust Double Helix, supra note 18, at 655; PRASANTA K. PATTANAIK, ESSAYS ON 
INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING AND SOCIAL WELFARE 14 (2009) (“While the game form approach provides a 
flexible framework for the analysis of rights, I now believe that it needs to be supplemented by information 
about the motivations that lie behind people’s actions.”); Alfred E. Kahn, supra note 61, at 186 (“The 
inescapable conclusion is that, from a practical standpoint, the criterion of intent alone ‘fills the bill’ for a 
sensible antitrust policy in such cases.”). 
211. See Horton, Antitrust Double Helix, supra note 19, at 643. 
212. Id. at 623 (“The simple normative mantra supporting the first strand of the Chicago/Harvard 
antitrust double helix is that the antitrust laws protect ‘competition, not competitors.’”). 
213. Id. at 623–34. 
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under the proposed evolutionary paradigm. In each case, under an evolutionary 
approach, a jury would have made the final determination and antitrust liability 
likely would have been imposed. Part B examines “false positives” under a 
consumer welfare economic standard, and again, in each case, the examination 
shows that a dramatically different result would have issued—in these cases, no 
antitrust liability. 
A. Applying Evolutionary Standards to Consumer Welfare False Negatives 
Could a fairness standard be meaningfully applied by juries in antitrust 
cases? This section examines the question in the context of predatory pricing 
cases. It is axiomatic that predatory pricing cases are highly disfavored in 
antitrust today.214 Under a line of three key Supreme Court cases, Matsushita, 
Brooke Group, and Weyerhaeuser, it has become virtually impossible for a 
plaintiff to win a predatory pricing case.215 
An analysis of predatory pricing since Matsushita and Brooke Group is 
beyond the scope of this article.216 What can safely be stated, however, is that: 
Together, Matsushita and Brooke Group have proven to be formidable 
hurdles to the successful prosecution of predatory pricing cases. Since 
Matsushita was decided in 1986, no plaintiff, including the Department 
of Justice, has succeeded in satisfying the two prong “below cost + 
recoupment” standard.217 
Furthermore, “after Brooke Group, it is easier to make the case that the legal 
standard for proof of monopolization through price predation has chilled 
predatory price complaints than to make the case that the law chills aggressive 
price-cutting.”218 
Chicago School adherents would claim, as the Supreme Court seemed to 
accept in Matsushita, that no plaintiffs have prevailed in recent predatory pricing 
cases because “predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely 
 
214. See, e.g., GAVIL ET AL., supra note 15, at 672. 
215. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986); Brooke Group v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220–225 (1993); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood 
Lumber, 549 U.S. 312, 318–20 (2007). 
216. An extensive array of impressive scholarly literature on the topic exists. For an excellent and 
extensive discussion of the history of “economic debate about predatory pricing,” see GAVIL ET AL., supra note 
15, at 675–80 and citations therein; see also Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant 
Firms: Striking a Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (2004); Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization 
Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253 (2003); Gregory J. Werden, The “No Economic Sense” Test for Exclusionary 
Conduct, 31 IOWA J. CORP. LAW 293 (2006). 
217. GAVIL, ET AL., supra note 15, at 672. 
218. Id. at 678. 
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successful.”219 On the other hand, it seems equally plausible that either the 
Court’s current standards are too demanding from an evidentiary standpoint, or 
are not economically sound or complete.220 
There is little question that an overly aggressive predatory pricing law could 
deter some legitimate conduct.221 As Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp properly 
recognize: “Antitrust would be acting foolishly if it forbade price cuts any time a 
firm knew that its cut would impose hardship on any competitor or even force its 
exit from the market.”222 
On the other hand, as Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp observe: “complete 
non-enforcement encourages anticompetitive conduct.”223 They believe that “[t]he 
goal should be to identify most cases of actual predation, while exonerating all 
those who have engaged in only competitive behavior or where the predation 
claims are doubtful.”224 Professors Gavil, Kovacic, and Baker observe: 
“Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, economists developed new theories 
that challenged the Chicago School view that price predation was never 
rational.”225 But these “modern economic theories of predatory pricing have as 
yet had little influence in the courts.”226 
Impossibly high burdens in predatory pricing cases are neither sound nor 
complete from an evolutionary perspective.227 As discussed below, from an 
evolutionary perspective, each of the Supreme Court’s three seminal cases, 
Matsushita, Brooke Group, and Weyerhaeuser was wrongly decided.228 The result 
in each of the cases was that meritorious antitrust cases were taken away from 
 
219. Matsushita, 574 U.S. at 589 (citing BORK, supra note 35, at 149–155); P. Areeda & D. Turner, 
Predatory Pricing Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 699 (1975); Frank Easterbrook, 
Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268 (1981). 
220. See GAVIL, ET AL., supra note 15, at 672; id. at 700 (“Standards that demand greater economic 
certainty can reduce the incidence of false positives, but they almost invariably do so by increasing processing 
costs and possibly the incidence of false negatives, as some of the demanded information proves to be 
unavailable or too costly to secure.”). 
221. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, § 723, at 24–25 (2008). 
222. Id. ¶ 722, at 21. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp add that “[i]ll-conceived or ill-defined rules 
impose heavy social costs by deterring legitimate pricing and by both increasing and complicating legislation.” 
Id. ¶ 723, at 25. 
223. Id. ¶ 723, at 24–25. 
224. Id. at 25. 
225. GAVIL, ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 15, at 678 (citing Paul Milgrom & 
John Roberts, New Theories of Predatory Pricing, in INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE IN THE NEW INDUSTRIAL 
ECONOMICS 112-37 (Giacomo Bonnano & Dario Brandolini, eds. 1990); Janusz Ordover & Garth Saloner, 
Predation, Monopolization & Antitrust, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 537–96 (Richard 
Schmalansee & Robert Willig eds., 1989); Joseph F. Brodley, et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and 
Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2259–62 (2000). 
226. GAVIL, ET AL., supra note 15, at 679 (citing Brodley, Strategic Theory, supra note 208, at 2258-60). 
227. See supra Section II.B. 
228. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986); Brooke Group v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220–25 (1993); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood 
Lumber, 549 U.S. 312, 318–20 (2007). 
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citizen jurors and placed in the hands of judges applying biased, normative, and 
unsound economic theories. The answer to the “Antitrust Paradox” in such cases 
is to allow jurors to apply their instinctive and community-based norms of 
fairness, and to carefully assess the true competitive intent of defendants in such 
cases.229 Had the Court followed an evolutionarily sound analysis, and allowed 
the juries to properly consider issues of fairness and intent, each of the cases 
would have been decided for the plaintiffs. Furthermore, leaving the cases in the 
hands of citizen jurors would have protected the plaintiffs’ Seventh Amendment 
jury rights in civil antitrust cases.230 
1. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Could fairness have potential relevance in Sherman Act § 1 cases? After all, 
what possible relevance could our evolutionary instincts for fairness have as to 
whether there is a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade? 
In Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio,231 a sharply divided 5-4 
Supreme Court overturned a Third Circuit ruling reversing a district court’s grant 
of summary judgment in a Sherman § 1 case.232 The Third Circuit had ruled “that 
a reasonable fact-finder could find a conspiracy to depress prices in the American 
[television set] market in order to drive out American competitors, which 
conspiracy was funded by excess profits obtained in the Japanese market.”233 
Citing Chicago School economic theories, the majority adopted an 
“economic plausibility” or “no economic sense test” in reviewing the allegations 
that defendants had conspired to restrain trade.234 The Court then agreed with 
petitioner defendant Japanese television manufacturers that the “alleged 
conspiracy [was] economically irrational and practically infeasible,” and that 
they had “no motive to engage in the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy; 
indeed they had a strong motive not to conspire in the manner respondents [had] 
allege[d].”235 The majority therefore ruled that no “genuine issue for trial” existed 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) as to the possible existence of an 
antitrust conspiracy.236 Since no reasonable jury could find that an antitrust 
conspiracy had existed, defendants were entitled to summary judgment.237 
 
229. See supra Section II.B. 
230. U.S. Const. amend. VII. 
231. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
232. Id. at 576, 580–82. 
233. Id. at 599. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had conspired to violate §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 
and § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. Id. 
234. Id. at 589–90. 
235. Id. at 588, 597–98. 
236. Id. at 598. 
237. Id. 
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The four dissenting justices, led by Justice White, argued that “[i]n defining 
what respondents must show in order to recover, the Court makes assumptions 
that invade the fact-finder’s province.”238 Addressing the majority’s “no 
economic sense test,” Justice White observed that “the Third Circuit [was] not 
required to engage in academic discussions about predation . . . .”239 
The Court’s “economic plausibility” test “has greatly increased the burden on 
plaintiffs240 attempting to prove conspiracies on the basis of indirect evidence.”241 
Indeed, “[i]n the antitrust area, Matsushita [has] greatly expanded the use of 
summary judgment, which in turn [has] focused a great deal of the effort that 
goes into antitrust litigation on preparation for and possible disposition of the 
case through summary judgment.”242 In an even broader sense, Matsushita has 
played a key role in the Supreme Court’s recent efforts to severely curtail jury 
trials in antitrust cases.243 
Matsushita was exactly the type of fact-intensive case that should have been 
decided by a jury under the Seventh Amendment.244 Instead of an economic 
plausibility test, which makes no evolutionary sense, the Court should have left it 
to a jury to apply their instinctive norms of fairness in evaluating defendants’ 
conduct. The district court could have asked the jurors as part of the jury 
instructions a couple of simple questions that jurors could readily understand and 
apply in reaching a decision. First, did defendants conspire to compete unfairly? 
Second, did defendants intend to harm competition? And third, was competition 
harmed by defendant’s unfair and anticompetitive actions? 
It is quite likely that reasonable jurors could and would have answered such 
questions affirmatively based on the extensive evidence before the Court.245 Had 
 
238. Id. at 601. 
239. Id. at 605–06. 
240. Ironically, even though it was adjudicated on the basis of summary judgment standards, “[t]he 
Matsushita case dragged on for over a dozen years.” See Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, in 
REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY: ESSAYS ON LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL POLICY 
211, 233 (Harry First et al. eds., 1991). 
241. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST: BLACK LETTER OUTLINES 108 (5th ed. 2011); see also A. 
GAVIL ET AL., supra note 15, at 277–80. 
242. GAVIL, ET AL., supra note 15, at 280. 
243. See, e.g., Horton, Antitrust Double Helix, supra note 19, at 647–51. 
244. See Horton, Antitrust Double Helix, supra note 19, at 663, n.281 (“[A] jury of twelve citizens could 
have more fairly and objectively reviewed the factual evidence and applied the relevant legal theories, and it 
would not have taken anything close to twelve years to get a final resolution.”); James F. Ponsoldt & Marc J. 
Lewyn, Judicial Activism, Economic Theory and the Role of Summary Judgment in Sherman Act Conspiracy 
Cases: The Illogic of Matsushita, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 575, 613 (1988) (“[T]he decision reflects broader 
political questions about the traditional role and power of juries in our democratic system to adjudicate private 
property rights and the attempt by the executive branch to infect otherwise private disputes with its 
noninterventionist ideology, thereby transforming the jury from its essential nonactivist role.”); Paul W. 
Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 141, 142 (2000) (arguing that decisions 
like Matsushita risk overriding the constitutional imperatives of the right to a civil jury trial under the Seventh 
Amendment). 
245. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 576–578. 
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basic fairness norms been applied, instead of judges attempting to decide whether 
the alleged conspiracy “made economic sense,” it is likely that citizen jurors 
would have held the defendants accountable for their conspiracy to restrain trade 
and monopolize the American television market.246 Indeed, it is not hard to 
imagine that an American jury would have been “morally outraged” by 
defendants’ conspiracy. 
2. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 
Brooke Group, like Matsushita, involved allegations of predatory pricing to 
harm competition. 247 Although the case was brought under § 2(a) of the Clayton 
Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, the Court ruled that the two 
prerequisites to recover were the same as for allegations of predatory pricing 
under § 2 of the Sherman Act.248 Plaintiff Liggett developed a line of generic 
cigarettes that it offered at list prices roughly thirty percent below the list prices 
for branded cigarettes.249 Liggett claimed that Brown & Williamson (“B&W”) 
had entered the generic market segment with below-cost prices “to pressure 
Liggett to raise list prices on its generics, thus restraining the economy segment’s 
growth and preserving Brown & Williamson’s supracompetitive profits on 
branded cigarettes.”250 Importantly, a civil jury agreed with plaintiff Liggett, and 
returned a verdict in its favor.251 The district court, however, overturned the 
verdict and ruled that B&W was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.252 The 
Fourth Circuit affirmed.253 
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed, relying heavily on its decision 
in Matsushita and its findings about “the general implausibility of predatory 
pricing.”254 The Court ruled that “the evidence [could not] support a finding that 
 
246. See Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, supra note 217, at 234 (arguing that since Matsushita “ [t]he 
study of strategic behavior has been elaborated to include the learning curve benefits of cumulative production, 
the attributes of investment, techniques for raising rivals’ cost, strategic reputation effects, and even 
international strategic features.”). 
247. 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
248. Id. at 222–24 (“[W]hether the claim alleges predatory pricing under § 2 of the Sherman Act or 
primary-line price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act, two prerequisites to recovery remain the 
same. First, a plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injury resulting from a rival’s low prices must prove that 
the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of its rival’s costs. . . .The second prerequisite to 
holding a competitor liable under the antitrust laws for charging low prices is a demonstration that the 
competitor had a reasonable prospect, or, under § 2 of the Sherman Act, a dangerous probability, of recouping 
its investment in below-cost prices.”). 
249. Id. at 212–15. 
250. Id. at 212, 214. 
251. Id. at 209. 
252. Id. at 218. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. at 219. 
255. Id. at 211, 227. The Court repeated its assertion from Matsushita that “predatory pricing schemes 
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Brown & Williamson’s alleged scheme was likely to result in oligopolistic price 
coordination and sustained supracompetitive pricing in the generic segment of 
the national cigarette market. Without this, Brown & Williamson had no 
reasonable prospect of recouping its predatory losses and could not inflict the 
injury to competition the antitrust laws prohibit.”255 Tellingly, the majority 
conceded that “the chain of reasoning by which we have concluded that Brown & 
Williamson is entitled to judgment as a matter of law is demanding.”256 
The dissenters, led by Justice Stevens, noted that: “After 115 days of trial, 
during which it considered 2,884 exhibits, 85 deposition excerpts, and testimony 
from 23 live witnesses, the jury deliberated for nine days and then returned a 
verdict finding that B&W engaged in price discrimination with a ‘reasonable 
possibility of injuring competition.’”257 Justice Stevens then poignantly observed, 
“The Court’s contrary conclusion rests on a hodgepodge of legal, factual, and 
economic propositions that are insufficient, alone or together, to overcome the 
jury’s assessment of the evidence.”258 He concluded: 
In my opinion, the jury was entitled to infer from the succession of price 
increases after 1985—when the prices for branded and generic cigarettes 
increased every six months from $33.15 and $19.75, respectively, to 
$46.15 and $33.75—that B&W’s below-cost pricing actually produced 
supracompetitive prices, with the help of tacit collusion among the 
players. But even if that were not so clear, the jury would surely be 
entitled to infer that B&W’s predatory plan, in which it invested millions 
of dollars for the purpose of achieving an admittedly anticompetitive 
result, carried a “reasonable possibility” of injuring competition.259 
What purpose did it serve to engage in the “difficult and demanding 
business” of applying esoteric normative economic theories to reach pre-ordained 
conclusions justifying predatory conduct designed and intended to eliminate 
competition? Instead, the Court should have let the jurors apply their instinctive 
norms of fairness by considering three additional questions: 1) did the defendant 
(or defendants) compete unfairly?; 2) did the defendant(s) intend to harm 
competition; 3) and if so, was competition harmed? It is abundantly clear from 
the jury’s decision in Brooke Group that the answer to each of the three questions 
almost certainly would have been in the affirmative. 
 
are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.” Id. at 226 (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589). The Court 
further urged that “the costs of an erroneous finding of liability are high.” Id. 
256. Id. at 243. 
257. Id.; see also A. A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396, 1400 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(Easterbrook, J.) (describing application of economic tests in antitrust cases as a “difficult business”). 
258. Id. at 254. 
259. Id.  
260. Id. at 258 (citations omitted). 
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3. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber 
In Weyerhaeuser, the Supreme Court once again overturned a jury finding of 
predatory activities—this time in a monopolization case under § 2 of the 
Sherman Act.260 Plaintiff sawmill Ross-Simmons’ (“R-S”) antitrust theory was 
simple.261 R-S alleged “that Weyerhaeuser drove it out of business by bidding up 
the price of sawlogs to a level that prevented [R-S] from being profitable.”262 
Following a nine-day trial, a civil jury agreed with R-S.263 The District Court 
instructed the jury that “[R-S] could prove that Weyerhaeuser’s bidding practices 
were anticompetitive acts if the jury concluded that Weyerhaeuser ‘purchased 
more logs than it needed, or paid a higher price for logs than necessary, in order 
to prevent [R-S] from obtaining the logs they needed at a fair price.”264 The jury 
returned a $26 million verdict against Weyerhaeuser, which was trebled to 
approximately $79 million.265 
Holding that “[p]redatory-pricing and predatory bidding claims are 
analytically similar,” the Court vacated the judgment for plaintiff and remanded 
the case with instructions to the district court to apply the two-pronged Brooke 
Group standard.266 Consequently, R-S would need to prove: 1) “that the alleged 
predatory bidding led to below-cost pricing of the predator’s outputs”; and 2) 
“that the defendant ha[d] a dangerous probability of recouping the losses incurred 
in bidding up input prices through the exercise of monopsony power.”267 The 
Court ignored substantial economic commentary, much less the lessons of 
history,268 showing that price predation can be a deadly effective strategy for 
eliminating a pesky competitor or forcing it to raise its prices.269 
Once again, the court should have applied a fairness standard by asking the 
jurors three basic questions: 1) did Weyerhaeuser compete unfairly?; 2) did 
Weyerhaeuser intend to harm competition?; and 3) if so, was competition harmed 
by Weyerhaeuser’s unfair and anticompetitive activities? Based on the jury’s 
findings, it seems almost certain that the jury would have answered the questions 
 
261. 549 U.S. 312, 315–16 (2007). 
262. Id. at 316. 
263. Id. at 314–15. 
264. Id. at 316. 
265. Id. at 317. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. at 321, 326. 
268. Id. at 325. 
269. See, e.g., GAVIL, ET AL., supra note 15, at 675 (“Predatory pricing is a common feature of accounts 
of monopolization, and was widely considered a serious problem during the early decades of the 20th century.”); 
Chicago School commentators disagree that predatory pricing historically has occurred. See, e.g., John S. 
McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958) (arguing that 
Standard Oil never engaged in price predation); BORK, supra note 35, at 144–45 (arguing that below-cost 
pricing is irrational because most predators could not reasonably expect to recoup their losses from doing so). 
270. See, e.g., Symposium, Buyer Power and Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 505 (2005). 
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in the affirmative.270 Consequently, the jury’s verdict for the plaintiff should have 
been left in place. 
B. Applying Evolutionary Standards to Consumer Welfare False Positives 
Ironically, applying “consumer welfare” economics in antitrust cases not 
only creates numerous dangerous “false negatives,” as discussed above, but 
“false positives,” as well. As seen, consumer welfare economics frequently 
produces “false negatives” in cases alleging predatory conduct by dominant firms 
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act or under the Robinson-Patman Act.271 
Paradoxically, those same “consumer welfare” economics generate false 
positives in cases that allege collusion under Section 1 of the Sherman Act but 
pose no real dangers to competition from an evolutionary perspective.272 Such a 
false positive was generated in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn.273As 
discussed below, application of an evolutionary-based fairness/intent/competitive 
harm approach would have yielded a much different and more rational outcome. 
1. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn. (“SCTLA”) 
SCTLA involved a group of private practice lawyers in the District of 
Columbia who agreed to accept appointments under the District’s Criminal 
Justice Act (“CJA”) to represent indigent criminal defendants.274 For many years, 
CJA lawyers voiced serious concerns to the District of Columbia and its political 
leaders concerning the inadequacy of the low compensation rates paid to CJA 
lawyers.275 Ultimately, a large percentage of the CJA lawyers voted at an SCTLA 
meeting to stop signing up for new appointments until their fees were 
increased.276 “On September 6, 1983, about 90% of the CJA regulars refused to 
accept any new assignments.”277 After Mayor Marion Berry recommended 
legislation increasing CJA fees to $35/hour, and the city council unanimously 
passed the bill on September 20, 1983278 CJA lawyers began accepting new 
assignments the very next day.279 
Ironically, as Justice Blackmun noted in his separate dissenting opinion, 
“public opinion supported the boycott”; and city officials and representatives 
 
271. See supra at Part III.A. 
272. See infra Part III.B.1. 
273. 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
274. Id. at 414–15. 
275. Id. at 415–16. 
276. Id. at 416–17. 
277. Id. at 416. 
278. Id. at 418. 
279. Id. 
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“may have welcomed the appearance of a politically expedient ‘emergency.’”280 
Despite very strong public support and the unanimous passage of new CJA 
legislation, the FTC saw its mission as protecting the Chicago School’s 
“consumer welfare” standard.281 The FTC alleged that  the SCTLA and four of its 
officers had “entered into an agreement among themselves and with other 
lawyers to restrain trade by refusing to compete for or accept new appointments 
under the CJA program. . .until the District of Columbia increased the fees 
offered under the CJA program.”282 The FTC characterized the SCTLA’s 
activities as “a conspiracy to fix prices and to conduct a boycott.”283 Although the 
FTC filed its complaint under Section 5 of the FTC Act,284 each of the tribunals 
that reviewed the conduct, including the ALJ, the FTC, the District of Columbia, 
and the Supreme Court found that it was “a classic restraint of trade within the 
meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”285 Ultimately, the Supreme Court 
found that the SCTLA had conducted a per se illegal group boycott to enforce 
and implement a naked price-fixing agreement that resulted in higher prices to 
consumers (the District of Columbia taxpayers). 
The Court followed a classic “consumer welfare” economics line of 
reasoning. An evolutionary fairness/intent/harm to competition analysis would 
likely have yielded an opposite result. First, had the CJA lawyers really conspired 
to unfairly harm competition? The Court found that “[p]rior to the boycott CJA 
lawyers were in competition with one another, each deciding independently 
whether and how often to offer to provide services to the District at CJA rates.”286 
But anyone who has actually accepted a CJA appointment in the District of 
Columbia would find the notion of the lawyers competing for cases to be 
laughable.287 First, CJA lawyers have no control over output, since the cases are 
generated by arrests.288 Second, there is no fee competition, since the 
reimbursement rates are set by legislation, and CJA lawyers cannot unilaterally 
change that.289 And third, no matter how many lawyers are accepting CJA cases at 
any one time, the District of Columbia inevitably has to supplement their efforts 
through the Public Defender’s Office and pro bono appointments.290 Furthermore, 
the appointments are made on a “first-come/first-serve basis.”291 So how did the 
 
280. Id. at 454 (J. Blackmun concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
281. See id. at 418–19. 
282. Id. at 418. 
283. Id. 
284. 15 U.S.C. § 45. The relevant portion of the statute (15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)) stated: “Unfair methods 
of competition . . . and unfair or deceptive acts or practices…are hereby declared unlawful.” Id. 
285. FTC, 493 U.S. 411 at 422. 
286. Id. 
287. See id. at 414–15. 
288. See id. at 415. 
289. See id. at 414–15. 
290. See id.  
291. See id. at 415. 
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CJA lawyers compete in any meaningful sense?292 Furthermore, in what 
evolutionary or practical sense did the CJA lawyers act unfairly? The only 
possible way they could persuade the District to pass new legislation was through 
a political boycott, which was encouraged by the Mayor and other city 
officials.293 
Similarly, where was their intent to harm competition? Since the CJA 
lawyers were never really competing in any meaningful or practical sense, how 
could they harm competition? And where was the harm to the competitive 
process? As Justice Blackmun insightfully noted, the District of Columbia “had 
the power to terminate the boycott at any time by requiring any or all members of 
the District Bar—including the members of SCTLA—to represent indigent 
defendants pro bono.”294 It was well within the political and economic power of 
the District of Columbia to keep its CJA rates at pre-boycott levels.295 Because of 
political pressure, however, the people’s elected representatives unanimously 
chose not to.296 
Ultimately, the Court’s consumer welfare economic analysis resulted in an 
overly technical, politically naïve, and economically frivolous application of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The false positive that the consumer welfare 
economic analysis generated could have been avoided through a more practical 
and meaningful evolutionary fairness/intent/competitive harm analysis. One can 
only wish that the FTC and the Courts would have spent the same time and 
energy worrying about trying to stop competitively harmful predatory conduct by 
dominant firms, as they spent on this frivolous protection of consumer welfare.297 
 
292. In classifying the CJA lawyers as classic economic competitors, the Court cited the Court of 
Appeals’ reasoning that: 
The Commission correctly determined the CJA regulars act as ‘competitors’ in the only sense that 
matters for antitrust analysis: They are individual business people supplying the same service to a 
customer, and as such may be capable, through a concerted restriction on output, of forcing that 
customer to pay a higher price for their service. That the D. C. government, like the buyers of many 
other services and commodities, prefers to offer a uniform price to all potential suppliers does not 
alter in any way the anti-competitive potential of the petitioners’ boycott. The antitrust laws do not 
protect only purchasers who negotiate each transaction individually, instead of posting a price at 
which they will trade with all who come forward. 
Id. at 422–23, n. 9. 
293. See id. at 445. The Court cited the Court of Appeals conclusion that “Mayor Barry and other 
important city officials were sympathetic to the boycotters’ goals and may even have been supportive of the 
boycott itself,” and that the Mayor may have actually encouraged the demonstration to create public support. Id. 
294. Id. at 453. 
295. See id. 
296. See id. at 415–16. 
297. It is a closer call, but a similar example can be found in the case of United States v. Brown 
University, 5 F.3d 658 (3rd Cir. 1993). The case involved an agreement by the Ivy League college institutions 
and MIT to award financial aid only on the basis of demonstrated need. Id. at 661–62. The universities felt that 
their agreement helped “[promote] socio-economic diversity at member institutions”; “provided some students 
who otherwise would not have been able to afford [such an education] the opportunity to have one”; and 
“promoted competition for students…in areas other than price.” Id. at 674–75. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Steady and unremitting efforts since the 1970s by neoclassical economic 
theorists to excise fairness from the antitrust lexicon have been wildly 
successful.298 In many contemporary American antitrust circles today, fairness is 
a dirty word and laughable idea.299 Consumer welfare and allocative efficiency 
are the sole goals of contemporary American antitrust.300 The idea that fairness 
should be part of the antitrust lexicon is considered naïve and foolish.301 
Fortunately, overwhelming evidence and findings from the fields of 
evolutionary biology and behavioral economics are reopening the once closed 
“fairness versus welfare” debate in antitrust.302 This development is timely and 
welcome, as “Chicago School” and “Post-Chicago” consumer welfare economics 
have been fully field-tested and have failed.303 The time is therefore ripe to 
reassess issues of fairness in antitrust from an evolutionary perspective. 
Evolutionary biologists and behavioral economists increasingly appreciate 
and demonstrate how fundamental and critical our sense of fairness has been to 
our long-term evolutionary and economic success.304 Throughout our 
evolutionary history, fairness has been critical to our ability to work 
cooperatively and effectively in social groups, and to build stable and lasting 
economic networks.305 In short, fairness counts. 
Unfortunately, in eschewing norms of fairness in our antitrust analyses and 
theories, we have moved away from our evolutionary heritage and are in danger 
of becoming “moral zombies” and economic sociopaths. For antitrust to 
ultimately be meaningful and effective, we must return to a system grounded in 
moral norms of fairness, and stop trying to make decisions in a moral vacuum. 
A workable antitrust fairness standard can be developed and applied by 
paying increased attention and deference to evolutionary norms of fairness, 
intent, and competitive harm, including injury to competitors from unfair and 
 
In a 2-1 decision applying a sort of hybrid “consumer welfare”/evolutionary analysis, the Court of 
Appeals decided that the District Court should apply a full rule of reason analysis to the case. The dissenting 
judge applied much more of an evolutionary analysis and noted how “[a]s a result of these policies, the record 
demonstrates that the number of students from minority groups and non-affluent families who attend [the Ivy 
institutions and MIT] has increased dramatically in recent years.” 5 F.3d at 682. Dissenting Judge Weis found 
neither an intent to harm competition, nor actual competitive harm from the universities’ policies. 
Once again, a false positive applying a consumer welfare economic analysis would have been negated 
through an evolutionary analysis. 
298. See supra Part II.A. 
299. See supra note 1. 
300. See supra Part II.A. 
301. Id. 
302. See supra Part II.B. 
303. See supra notes 105–110. 
304. See supra notes 113–125. 
305. Id. 
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predatory acts by cartels, dominant firms, and monopolies.306 It is therefore 
recommended that antitrust tribunals and regulators begin applying an 
evolutionarily based fairness/intent/competitive harm analysis, instead of the 
biased, outmoded, and dangerously ineffective economic consumer welfare 
norms currently in use. It is further recommended that we start returning 
behavioral antitrust cases to jurors, who have evolved the ability to critically 
evaluate and assess fairness and intent and apply community norms of morality. 
 
 
306. The economic arguments that protecting competitors against predatory conduct is inconsistent with 
either consumer or total welfare have not held up in terms of the importance of enhanced innovation and 
increased consumer choice, as a result of economic diversity. See, e.g., Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, 
Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175 (2007) (emphasizing the 
importance of consumer choice in antitrust analyses); Horton, Antitrust Double Helix, supra note 19, at 670, 
n.311 (discussing a variety of historical, behavioral, and economic reasons why innovation is likely to be 
reduced in more concentrated markets notwithstanding increased efficiency claims). 
